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West Europe Report

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30 JUNE 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

LIBERAL PARTY THREATENS TO FORCE EARLY ELECTION

SDP Paper Perceives Frustration

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 11 May 86 p 8

[Editorial: "Liberals Threaten"]

[Text] The Liberal Party now feels itself so squeezed that it considers it necessary to threaten an election, which nobody in the party would dare undertake under any circumstances.

Many former Liberal Party voters have gone over to Poul Schluter, and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and company have for a long time fought a hard fight to capture votes from the Progressive Party. That is one of the reasons why the Liberal Party is today the government's most right-leaning party.

The Liberals are crying louder and louder to be heard. Exactly as Mogens Glistrup did, until nobody bothered to listen to him.

The chairman of the Folketing Market Committee, Svend Heiselberg (Liberal) called Anker Jorgensen and Lasse Budtz "useful idiots." And Bjorn Elmquist threatened an election. "We do not want to administer an alternative policy. If it gets just a little worse we will call for an election." And furthermore Elmquist threatened to make a tax on fertilizer a cabinet question.

One of the Liberal Party's political problems is that Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is not the only one of the party's top people who has difficulty understanding that a minority government cannot do whatever suits it.

Democracy can be clumsy to dance with. Apparently too clumsy for many Liberals.

Coalition Partners Reject Ideal

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 12 May 86 p 6

[Article by sib: "Liberals Stand Alone With Their Election Threats"]

[Text] Copenhagen--The Liberal Party stands entirely alone with its desire to call an election as a reaction to the Radical Liberal Party wanting to carry out an increase in the land tax and an environmental tax on fertilizer outside the government.

Not the Basis for an Election

"That's up to the Liberals," said the Conservative group chairman Knud Ostergaard, commenting on the election. "Land tax is a serious issue, but it can never be the basis for an election, as for example the NATO question can."

Flemming Kofod-Svendsen (Christian People's Party) confirmed that the government will permit the Radicals and the Liberals to debate the land tax and the tax on fertilizer alone. A fall election would be a pure "proportional strain" according to Kofod-Svendsen.

The Proposal Is Reasonable

"The proposal for a minimum limit of six mills on land tax, which we have advanced with the Social Democrats, is both reasonable and thoroughly prepared, and the Liberal Party has furthermore known our attitude toward the issue for a year," said Niels Helveg Petersen (Radical Liberal Party).

"It is foolish of the Liberals to threaten an election, because that would only cause trouble. I do not favor an election, and even if one should take place we will not change our attitude toward the land tax and the environmental tax on fertilizer," said Helveg Petersen.

9287

CSO:3613/140

POLITICAL

FINLAND

PAPER ANALYZES RESULTS FROM LATEST GALLUP POLL

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 22 May 86 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Green Winds Blowing Toward the Middle"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] The winds of public opinion are now blowing toward the political center and the question is to what extent the winds are green, writes Bjorn Mansson who has reviewed the public opinion situation in light of the latest Gallup figures.

With less than 10 months to go before the parliamentary election, the Finnish Gallup figures on party support provide a basis for analyzing the political opinion situation. The poll was conducted at the request of the four biggest parties in the period from 7 to 30 April. When evaluating the results one should bear in mind that this was too early for any "Chernobyl effect" to show up.

The civil servants' strike had begun then, but even the latest field interviews were conducted several weeks before the president intervened. And when the impact of the strike on political opinion is assessed, one should bear in mind that the effect is twofold: on the one hand there is the strikers' possible reappraisal of their own party sympathies and on the other there are the reactions of the general public to the strike. The first group is much smaller than the second, which turned increasingly against the strikers as the strike dragged on. The decision-makers who joined the president in taking a stand against the strikers' demands--most notably Finance Minister Pekka Vennamo and his Rural Party--should have scored more pluses than minuses if one looks at public opinion as a whole.

Keeping in mind these reservations and the critical attitude toward opinion polls that is always justified, some general trends can be noted:

Left-wing support is declining. However total support for leftist parties stands at 38 percent, according to the poll, somewhat more than might have been expected. It is only a little less than the 1984 municipal election results, although it is almost 3 percent below the results in the 1983 parliamentary election.

Support for the nonsocialist parties also seems to be a few percentage points lower than the latest election figures, but actually the Finnish Rural Party is solely responsible for the decline (plus a little more), while the Conservatives and the Swedish People's Party [SFP] were stable and Center support increased. The so-called traditional nonsocialist parties now have a support level of around 50 percent, which should be enough to ensure a parliamentary majority.

Aside from the Center Party the Greens are the big winners in the Gallup poll. However this depends a little on one's basis of comparison. Compared to the 1.5 percent in the parliamentary election, 5.2 percent is certainly an excellent result, but compared to the almost 5 percent in the municipal elections the gain is less spectacular. One can also say that the Rural Party's loss is the Green Party's gain--although the flow of voters does not go exclusively from one to the other.

If individual parties are examined in light of the latest Gallup figures, one can note the following:

The Conservative Party's rating of 22.7 percent is only a fraction higher than the party's 1983 election results and this tends to support the conclusion that the party's situation is stable. Chernobyl might have a negative effect while the civil servants' strike might have a somewhat positive effect. In other words, the pluses and minuses tend to cancel each other out.

SFP support is also stable at its normal level of just below 5 percent. It is hard to see that either Chernobyl or the strike will have any direct effect here. The support of Swedish-speaking Finns for their SFP, which has remained unshaken for 80 years, is not usually affected that easily--especially since the party has sympathized with general public opinion on nuclear power and has behaved in an evenhanded way throughout the strike.

The Center Party's gain in the polls now is noteworthy. If the Liberal share is removed from the election results, the progression is impressive: from 16.6 percent in 1982 to over 18.9 in 1984 to no less than 20.4 now. It should be observed here that Paavo Vayrynen's presidential candidacy did not really become apparent until the final phase of the polling period. But it seems likely that the sharpening of the Center profile had an effect. Whatever the reason, a gain of almost 4 percentage points (or an increase of almost 25 percent!) is extremely unusual under our circumstances as far as traditional parties are concerned.

If we include the Liberal rating of around 1 percent and the Christian support level of between 2 and 3 percent, the middle bloc is clearly larger than the Conservatives and the Social Democrats and comes close to a support level of 30 percent! Even the traditional middle parties (the Center Party, SFP and the Liberal People's Party [LFP]) alone now have more support than both the Conservatives and the Social Democrats. It is interesting to note that the Center organ SUOMENMAA stressed this to some extent in its editorial

space, which may be regarded as an indication of how the party ultimately feels about the Christian Party's participation in the middle-party co-operation.

The Rural Party's Gallup figure of 4.5 percent is half of the party's 9.7 percent rating in the parliamentary election and a good deal lower than the 5.3 percent the party won in the municipal elections. But before drawing any sweeping conclusions it should be noted that opinion polls in general tend to underestimate support for the Rural Party [FLP]. The party is also doing its best to achieve a positive Chernobyl effect, although its absolute opposition to nuclear power gives a somewhat hollow impression.

It is more interesting to indulge in speculations about FLP and the civil servants' strike. Pekka Vennamo's conduct, which was on the borderline of what is permitted in his official position, and the party's strong support--as the only party to offer any--for the president's threat of compulsory arbitration, undoubtedly cost the party the votes of some civil servants. But the party may have picked up considerable support among the "broad layers" of the population in compensation.

As noted above, the Green gains in the polls depend on what one compares them with. But a possible Chernobyl effect has not yet appeared. The question is how the Green line of absolute abolition is to be made credible, especially in view of the fact that they also demand (quite consistently, to be sure) a halt to the importation of electricity produced by nuclear power--as if electricity can be "earmarked."

How the Greens manage to mobilize their potential support in the election campaign also depends a great deal on whether the voters remain unorganized or not--and if they do organize, how this is done. Groups at the election district level would seem most appropriate, but there is still a lot of disagreement.

The Social Democrats' position as the largest party seems unchallenged, in spite of a decline to 25 percent of the vote compared to almost 27 percent in the 1983 parliamentary election. Thus the expectations of a large influx of frustrated People's Democrats have not materialized. The influx seems limited to people like Ilkka-Christian Bjorklund.

If we are to believe the Gallup figures, the decline of the People's Democratic League is not as great as was generally anticipated. The two People's Democratic/Communist groups now have the support of 13 percent of the voters, only 1 percent less than the last election result. Other opinion polls conducted recently have given much lower figures.

However the interesting thing about this poll is that the minority communists' "Democratic Alternative" has now had its voter support measured for the first time--and registered a modest 1.2 percent compared to 11.8 for the "mother" group, the People's Democratic League and the Finnish Communist Party. Although Finnish CP information chief Oiva Bjorkbacka is undoubtedly

right to warn his people in KANSAN UUTISET that the 1.2 percent figure "does not necessarily reflect the final reality" (the minority's election party has not yet had a chance to make its mark), the results show how hard it is for the minority to establish itself with the Finnish electorate. Taisto Sinisalo has no reason to rejoice.

Thus there is no polarization of voter opinion in sight at this time. The far left is losing ground and the Conservatives are not winning very much. The winds of public opinion are now blowing toward the political center. They are green winds--in the broadest sense of the word.

6578

CSO: 3650/222

POLITICAL

GREECE

INVESTMENTS REPORTEDLY PLANNED BY AL-FATAH

Athens ETHNOS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 25 May 86 p 11

[Article by Th. Lyrtsogiannis]

[Excerpt] The PLO will propose that Arab capital be invested in Greece and that economic relations with our country be upgraded. This will be done at this year's summit meeting of Arab heads of state.

This statement was made in an interview granted to our newspaper by Mr Abbas Zaki, member of the Al-Fatah Revolutionary Council, who is in charge of foreign relations and is also a member of the political office of the PLO. Mr Zaki was in Greece as a representative of his organization at the KKE (int) meetings.

"In spite of the fact that you Greeks helped us a great deal, Arabs unfortunately do not consider Greece the way they should. We believe that there should be a very specific stance by the Arabs vis-a-vis your country," Mr Zaki said at the beginning of the interview.

[Question] "What do you think this stance should be?"

[Answer] "Listen. We have very good relations with Greece. We believe that Arabs cannot have the same type of relations with, say, England, as with Greece. As the PLO, we shall present the issue of relations with European countries and we shall ask that these should be in conformance with their attitude. We shall ask that Arab funds not be left at the service of Israeli Zionism and of Americans, but that they be channeled to countries that support us."

/8309

CSO: 3521/163

POLITICAL

GREECE

REPORTED TENDENCY TOWARD PASOK SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC WING

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 28 May 86 p 3

[Text] The recent article of former minister Ap. Lazaris in TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS certain initiatives by National Bank Governor St. Panagopoulos, and various moves of Deputy Minister of Culture Giorgos Papandreou make it clear that preparations are being made within PASOK to create a western-European type of social-democratic tendency which will attempt to attract to itself the liberal and centrist political public. Consequently, the estimations of MESIMVRINI Director Khr. Pasalaris, who in recent articles has noted that PASOK is preparing for a political turn to the right are judged to be sound.

"Seriously wounded by political erosion and corruptible as ever," writes Pasalaris, "PASOK is masquerading impetuously as an urban or even large-urban party--from the immature party it was in 1981 and the small-urban party it was in 1984--in order to perform its latest one-act play to...a rightist audience! And to seize the votes of conservatives, as it did in June with the votes of the...captains!"

"Maybe, however, some more "accidents," like those of Kitsios and Manikas, will step in as the great performance. Maybe the scene will change suddenly. Maybe, maybe.... The pitcher cannot go in the spring many times without breaking...!"

What the MESIMVRINI journalist is ignoring, of course, is that PASOK's large-urban identity is favored by a large part of the dominant Greek large-urban strata which, being born and bred in national-political power, are working today with those political forces they think have a future. Even if something begins to stir in the opposition, it is too late, according to many observers. PASOK now has every facility to create leftist and center-rightist crutches which will support it politically through a process of distribution of power, which will surely be broken up in the future. As for the so-called liberal area, authoritative observers note that since it has never existed as a political reality in Greece, there is no future for it today. The Greek hour for liberalism, foreign circles estimate, will ring when the political generation which buried it has disappeared.

PASOK, moreover, knows very well the liberal area's inability to produce ideas and prospects and it is exploiting, irreproachably, an intellectual juncture it is creating and controlling itself. Thus, it is not accidental that PASOK will soon begin a new and wide-spread ideological campaign which will use ideas and messages belonging, in the main, to the liberal cultural heritage! Of course, in PASOK's case, the related sloganizing will contain abundant doses of anti-Americanism, but why not? I wonder if there are many Greeks who have read De Tocqueville and his words about democracy in America?

POLITICAL

GREECE

ND GAINS IN PROFESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Jun 86 p 3

/Text/ The DKM /Democratic Movement of Engineers/ --it is pro-ND--once again was shown to be the number one power in the day before yesterday's elections of the SPME /Association of Civil Engineers of Greece/, obtaining 42.09 percent of the vote compared to 39.52 percent in 1984.

This victory is deemed important not only because DKM increased its percentage but because first of all abstentions were 50 percent and secondly because DIANA /Democratic Renewal/ took part in the elections. The latter is in the same political sphere and it obtained 2.13 percent of the vote.

Also significant is the fact that PASOK lost 7.33 percent.

The KKE increased its strength by one seat, while the KKE (Int.) remained the same.

More specifically and according to the final results, the seven factions taking part in the elections came out as follows:

DKM (ND): 2,093 votes, 42.09 percent, six seats, compared to 39.52 percent and six seats in 1984.

PASK /as published/ (PASOK): 1,068 votes, 21.47 percent, three seats, compared to 28.80 percent and four seats in 1984.

DPK /as published/ (KKE): 917 votes, 18.44 percent, three seats, compared to 15.65 percent and two seats in 1984.

DASK /Democratic Autonomous Trade Union Movement/ (KKE (Int.)): 542 votes, 10.9 percent, two seats, compared to 12.5 percent and two seats in 1984.

DEM /as published/ (Independent): 216 votes, 4.34 percent, one seat, compared to 3.50 percent and one seat in 1984.

ADIK /as published/ (DIANA): 106 votes, 2.13 percent, no seats.

AMP /as published/ (Trotskyite): 31 votes, 0.62 percent.

It is to be noted that of the 10,300 engineers, there were 4,973 valid ballots. Mr S. Kouvelas, a civil engineer, ND deputy and a candidate for mayor of Salonica, in a telegram sent to the DKM, he congratulated it for its proud victory.

5671

CSO: 3521/162

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

KKE(INT) DEVELOPMENTS PLEASE PASOK--According to estimations and forecasts of a significant portion of PASOK cadres, developments in the KKE(Int) area are considered to be absolutely positive. This is because the creation in the Greek left area of a political force which will not have a communist stamp will help PASOK's political collaborations, particularly if a simple proportional system is instituted in the next elections. As factors from PASOK say, the creation of a non-communist leftist political vehicle in the next elections could turn out to be determinative for PASOK's remaining in power. Because it would be possible for such a vehicle to attract PASOK's dissatisfied adherents, weaken the KKE and eventually participate in a collaborative government with PASOK. In addition, PASOK factors say that, if Papandreou secures a viable possibility for collaboration to the left, then he will make new overtures to the traditional liberal area so as to maintain the anti-Mitsotakis centrist element housed in PASOK. From this viewpoint, certain recent initiatives by Deputy Minister Giorgos Papandreou, Minister of Commerce Giorgos Katsifaras, National Bank Governor Styl. Panagopoulos, and the prime minister himself, are not devoid of the developments being prescribed--developments which indicate that the governing of Greece by center-leftist governments, with strong populist elements, is tending to become a permanent situation. There has begun to be a deeper awareness of this fact, moreover, both in the country's productive classes and in many chancelleries of EEC member-countries. [Text] [Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 21 May 86 p 2] 9247

SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP DEBATE--A dispute--but one without particular dimensions--has broken out between certain PASOK cadres; it concerns whether the movement should enter the Socialist International or not. Thus, Eurodeputy Khr. Papoutsis maintains that, for reasons of political expediency, PASOK must remain outside the Socialist International; this is in order to not create problems in its base, which has been reared with third-world slogans, and to not cut off the road which will allow it to attract political clientele from the communist left. On their side, however, other cadres maintain that PASOK must place itself in the Socialist International, first because Bulent Ecevit is moving comfortably to it, and gaining points, in a period in which Turkey is flirting strongly with the West at all levels. Second, they maintain that PASOK's separation from the socialists in the Socialist International has negative repercussions from both a diplomatic and economic viewpoint. And these repercussions, it is supported, will have, at some phase, a national cost which is far higher than the temporary electoral benefits seen by those opposed to entry in the Socialist International. At any rate, thus far Papoutsis' inclination seems to have the upper hand; this became clear with the young Eurodeputy's recent intervention at the Fourth KKE Interior Congress. [Text] [Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 21 May 86 p 2] 9247

30 June 1986

THIRD-WORLD OFFICIALS' VISITS--According to the well-known policy of double-speak on both domestic and foreign issues and our country's international relations, the Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs is going to come to Greece soon to brief the government on the efforts to transform his country's Marxist regime into a "People's Republic." A similar briefing was made previously by Ethiopian Ambassador in Athens [S. Tefferu] to KKE Secretary General Florakis. The Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs is a close acquaintance of Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias, who had made a suggestion to the prime minister and has received a "green light" for the official visits to Greece of representatives from third-world Marxist regimes to continue. All this, of course, in the frameworks of the effort the government is making to "sell" a "progressive" face to its base, without knowing, however, the negative impressions it is creating abroad--where impressions play a crucial diplomatic role. [Text] [Athens EMBIS-TEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 28 May 86 p 2] 9247

U.S. AMBASSADOR'S PUBLIC IMAGE--U.S. Ambassador Bob Keeley is systematically attempting to improve his public image. After consultations, he is selecting the newspapers and the reporters with whom he talks in order that they publish whatever he thinks is favorable to him, following the negative impression left by some of his and his wife's observations on our country's internal affairs, which should not have been of any concern to him as an ambassador. It would undoubtedly have been better for him if what was said in Washington and later here had not been said at all. Unless it was said after a recommendation (from Washington). [Text] [Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 23-29 May 86 p 10] /8309

CSO: 3521/163

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN MAIN PARTIES' SUPPORTERS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 22 May 86 p 3

[Article by Editor Pieter Maessen: "Surprising Breakthrough of Victorious CDA among Non-Confessional Voters"]

[Text] The voter survey carried out by the Intomart Bureau yesterday makes it possible to represent graphically the composition of adherents to each of the political parties. The analysis is based on the work of Dr C. Van der Eijk and Dr B. Niemoller of the University of Amsterdam.

The Hague, 22 May: Yesterday's voting pattern differed radically on several important issues from the usual pattern in the Netherlands. The CDA seems to have tapped new sources. The PvdA was able to gain strength in CDA districts.

Data on these shifts were gathered with the help of the voter survey, in which 35,000 voters told something more about themselves than they do at the polls. It is also clear that this survey suffers certain limitations. Of course it is impossible to reduce to a graph which voters stayed home. It is also a well-known fact that voters change parties more often than they let on. Yesterday 16 percent of the people claimed to have changed parties. In reality, the figure lies probably well above 20 percent. The results, however, are not distorted because of this.

In all, 17 Lower House seats went over to other parties yesterday. There were more changes, but the gains and losses partly canceled each other out. Until 1967 no less than 10 party seats ever changed hands. After that year the number fluctuated at about 18. It does not seem that the stability that marked the years before 1967 will ever return.

The relationships of strength between left and right remained perfectly equal with respect to 1982. The left, including D66, got 61 seats. If one bears in mind that Scholten and Dijkman went over to the left from the CDA during the drive, the left has lost two more seats.

Disloyal Voters

The largest segment of party adherents was constituted by the loyal voters. D66 consists of only one-third loyal voters. Half of the 1982 followers of D66 bolted the camp. One seat went back to the PvdA and one to the CDA. But D66

also won seats back from both sides, just as many from the left (PvdA) as from the right (CDA and VVD), relatively speaking.

The VVD saw a goodly number of voters (4.5 seats' worth) leave its ranks in favor of the CDA and also lost two seats to the PvdA and D66. The new voters helped limit VVD losses. Fewer PvdA and D66 voters went over to the VVD, however.

The PvdA gobbled up the PSP and the CPN on the left, thereby compensating for the loss of two seats to D66. On the right the PvdA was ultimately able to take away nothing from the CDA and VVD: roughly speaking, gains and losses balanced out evenly there. The PvdA--just like the CDA--profited greatly from the new, young voters and from those who stayed home in 1982.

Lastly the CDA won in both wings also, but especially on the right: 4.5 seats from the VVD, a half-seat from the small rightist parties (probably the RPF) and three seats from young, new voters. The voters who stayed home in 1982 really helped Lubbers here as well.

VOTING PATTERNS OF NEW VOTERS IN:

	CDA	PvdA	VVD	D66
1986:	30.8	28.4	20.5	9.8
1982:	19.7	23.8	30.6	5.1
1981:	21.2	21.7	19.4	19.3

The CDA gains surprised nearly everyone. Up to and including 1982 this party got its votes almost exclusively from confessional voters. The number of people who traditionally belong to this group is becoming smaller and smaller, however. What happened?

From the (gradually diminishing) group of believers who adhere faithfully to the church, the CDA can hardly claim that it has scored any gains: this group already traditionally gives its support overwhelmingly to the CDA (some 80 percent) while the rest vote the small rightist parties or stay home.

Gains are indeed possible from among those faithful who attend church less often: in the last three elections the CDA gained on the average a scant 30 percent of the votes from that source. Although no date are known on that score yet, it is probably because Lubbers polled more support from the CDA, especially from this group (constituting about 40 percent of the electorate).

Still more important, however, is the group of non-religiously affiliated (secular) voters (also about 40 percent of the electorate). Up to and including 1982 this group scarcely seemed to cast any votes whatever for confessional parties: only about 4 percent did that. In a recent Interview Bureau poll (conducted between 6 and 20 May among 6 500 participants), however, it was evident that no less than 11 percent of the non-confessionals listed the CDA as their party choice. If one remembers in this connection that the greatest gains for the CDA were probably realized in the last week before 21 May, he might give

serious thought to the fact that the percentage of non-confessionals who voted for the CDA is still higher. There is perhaps even a triplication of this percentage, from a practically insignificant number to a figure that gives the CDA at least a half-dozen seats from the secular voters. It seems rightly to be called a breakthrough, not one such as after the war, however, when the PvdA tried to break into the confessional camp. Thus it is a kind of reverse breakthrough. The PvdA sought that breakthrough consciously at that time, but did not succeed. The CDA did not in this instance consciously seek to overstep the "natural" boundaries, but must declare that it found followers without soliciting them, in another camp. Taking into consideration the strong connection between this breakthrough of the CDA and Lubbers the man, it is uncertain, however, whether the CDA has demonstrated lasting viability as a truly great party. Another possibility is that for a large group of non-confessional voters, the taboo against voting for a party that has a "C" in its name has now been broken, and in this way a new period in the relationships between political parties could begin.

Provinces


How are things going otherwise with the "old" breakthrough, that of the PvdA among religious voters, and therefore in religious districts? If the results by province are considered (see page 13 of this newspaper), a number of quite startling facts appear:

- 1) The CDA and the PvdA are both winning in all the provinces. Apparently the gains stand in the way of neither party.
- 2) The CDA gains were 5.2 percent nationally, those of the PvdA 2.9 percent. By province the recorded gains clearly differed, however. The PvdA (with its 7.7 percent) enjoyed much better than average gains in Limburg, Brabant (5.0) and Groningen (4.6). In the latter instance it had a great deal to do with the effect of the idling CPN party, which dropped back from 4.2 to 1.5 percent there.

In Limburg and Brabant, however, the PvdA recorded structural gains. The traditionally important Randstad (interurban zone of the west Netherlands) hardly contributed anything to these gains (and the chief cause of this seemingly favorable percentage of gains for Noord-Holland was the backsliding of the CPN, which was strong in Noord-Holland at an earlier date). In a word, when compared with the good results of the PvdA in Brabant and Limburg in 1977, there is now talk in those provinces of a structural breakthrough.



But the CDA also recorded gains everywhere, although not to the same extent everywhere. When compared with the national gains of 5.2 percent, the CDA did exceptionally well in Zuid-Holland (+6.5 percent), Utrecht (+6.4 percent) and Noord-Holland (+6.0 percent); that is, precisely in those districts where the PvdA made very little progress. Given the urbanization, lack of church attendance and secular character of the Randstad, the CDA gains here among non-confessional voters and those who seldom attend church seem to be the cause.

Table 1.






LOYAL CDA VOTERS

40.5



LOYAL PvdA VOTERS

40



Young Voters

For the first time since the beginning of the seventies, the Christian Democrats scored quite handsomely among the group of young voters. Since 1971 these voters always had a strong preference for new or non-confessional parties (PPR, D66, PvdA and PSP), but now for the first time in 1986, it seems that the CDA is the most popular party.

If we look at the figures for the new voters in the last three elections, it seems evident that this group increasingly reflects the broad shifts within the entire electorate in somewhat stronger measure:

- 1) In 1981 an almost equal following for each of the four largest parties;
- 2) In 1982 a very large following for that year's winner, the VVD;
- 3) In 1986 a very clear advance for the CDA and the VVD.

In any case it appears from the results of the poll among younger voters that the aging of the CDA, often considered as inevitable, need be anything but a foregone conclusion. It is still not clear whether this, too, was caused by the above-mentioned CDA breakthrough among weak or non-churchgoing voters. More comprehensive voter polls such as those organized by universities will necessarily provide answers to these questions in due time.

Yesterday's voting results point to the fact that the voter has further emancipated himself. He/She lets his/her behavior at the polls be determined less than formerly by (anti)religious motives, by social classes or by the areas where she/he lives. Conversely, they mean that the political and cultural differences between the regions have diminished.

8117

CSO: 3614/111

30 June 1986

POLITICAL

NORWAY

PAPER EXAMINES REASONS FOR FALL OF WILLOCH GOVERNMENT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 6 May 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Hagen Is Right"]

[Text] We are not among those who needlessly support the evaluations of the leader of the Progressive Party, Carl I. Hagen. When it comes to his analysis of the causes of the government crisis, we may, however, only establish: Carl I. Hagen is right.

If anything, it is somewhat immoral of Kåre Willoch, the Conservative Party, AFTENPOSTEN and others to blame Hagen and the Progressive Party for the government crisis. As far as we are able to evaluate the situation, Hagen was and remains willing to do anything to secure a Conservative-dominated government, apart from raising the indirect tax on gasoline. On this basis, it is inconceivable that a politician such as Kåre Willoch would not find his way out of the crisis. The problem was not Hagen--the problem was that Willoch and the coalition parties did not want to continue in government. This was also shown in the process taking place before the King directed Gro Harlem Brundtland to form a government. All versions of a nonsocialist government were rejected by the nonsocialist coalition parties. Despite the nonsocialist majority in the Storting. It was not up to Carl I. Hagen.

7262

CSOÆ 3639-116

POLITICAL

NORWAY

LABOR PARTY PAPER ON NEW GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 6 May 86 p 4

[Editorial: "In the Old Groove"]

[Text] Once the worst disappointment at the Willoch government's self-inflicted mortal wound has been overcome, the Conservative Party--and AFTENPOSTEN--may be expected to revert to their old grooves during their time in opposition. Their main occupation will then be the atrocity propaganda against the new government policy. We may safely expect the foreign and security policy to become one of the most central areas of the agitation of vulgarity. The first signs have already appeared.

AFTENPOSTEN yesterday gave us a sample of the level we may expect in the foreign policy debate in the future. It is a former personal secretary to Foreign Minister Sverre Strøm who has been given the opportunity to disseminate his personal opinions. And Hans Chr. Erlandsen is not without generosity. Norway will be facing the most dramatic change in its foreign policy course since 1948 if the Labor Party government chooses to put into practice its positions on central security policy issues, Erlandsen claims. The fate of the country will then be the same one as that of Denmark, and we shall be without security policy credibility in our defense and security policy.

We shall disregard the ugly disparagement inherent in such a characterization of one of our closest and friendliest neighboring countries. Everything will have to give way in the search of AFTENPOSTEN and the Conservative Party for arguments against the policy of the Labor Party, including the regard for our relations to a Nordic alliance partner. This is not surprising for those who have been following the various political campaigns of AFTENPOSTEN over the years.

When it comes to the description by Strøm's former close colleague of the credibility of Denmark's foreign and security policy, we believe that the fellow believers of Strøm in Denmark, as, for example, the Conservative government and Prime Minister Poul Schlüter, will feel called upon to protest. Denmark has in various contexts given expression to the positions taken by the majority of the Folketing. It is to be expected that there is great likelihood that the viewpoints are also supported by the majority of the Danish

electorate. If there has been any weakness in the line followed by the Danish government, it must be the fact that the government has brought itself into a situation where it has been in conflict with the majority of the Folketing.

The most important thing to a country's credibility in its security policy is to pursue a political line which is broadly supported by the people and which has strong political backing. The Willoch government has not had that in the nearly 5 years it has been in power. Foreign Minister Stray has on several occasions expressed himself in such ways in international fora as to make it necessary for him to change his political signals after contact with the Storting. In the most central issues of the disarmament policy, the government has constantly been on the point of being voted down in the Storting. Never before under other governments has it been necessary to have as many rounds of explanations and corrections in the foreign policy committee and in the Storting.

We, unfortunately, believe that this has damaged the Norwegian credibility internationally far more than the line followed by Denmark. It will now become the task of the Labor Party to correct this situation and anew stake out a foreign policy course which may unite both the Storting and the people.

7262

CSO: 3639/116

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS APPROVES BILL FOR SECURITY LAW

Lisbon 0 JORNAL in Portuguese 9-15 May 86 p 3

[Text] At a Council of Ministers yesterday, Thursday, the government approved the draft-bill of a new internal security law that is going to be considered before summer by the Assembly of the Republic.

Taking as a basis the previous administration's security law, which the Parliament approved in general, the Cavaco Silva government drafted a text that considers many of the positions assumed during the parliamentary debate. The general duties of the citizens to collaborate with the security authorities contained in the PS's regulation were restricted, and the type of powers of the police as well as the processes of identification of persons before the police authorities were established more strictly.

Telephone tapping "of and for suspects" will be permitted "in case of overwhelming urgency," when acts of terrorism and terrorist suppression are involved but, at the same time, they have to be authorized by the minister of Internal Administration and a judge.

On the other hand, a Superior Internal Security Council, subordinated to the prime minister, and a Security Coordinating Office operating within the MAI will be created. These agencies are intended to coordinate all aspects of the area.

In the meantime, a new law for the services of foreigners is already being prepared.

8711/7051
CSO: 3542/103

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CUNHAL STATEMENT ON TIES ANGERS MDP/CDE

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 9-15 May 86 p 12

[Text] The leaders of the MDP/CDE, the PCP's partner in the APU coalition, were very disturbed by Alvaro Cunhal's statements in an interview with the staff of O DIARIO, regarding this small party and its independence to make alliances with whomever it pleased (case of the PS or PRD).

Cunhal said: "One cannot believe that the MDP will decide to abandon the alliance with the PCP and exchange it for other alliances. It would be the road to the loss of its party identity and independence and to its own liquidation."

In other words, the MDP will be independent, have a party identity, and exist only as long as it depends, on the level of party alliances, on the dominance of the PCP.

The MDP/CDE, which is now going through an intense internal debate in which the question of alliances is a particularly pertinent point, did not like either the message or the disdain shown by the PCP leader. Consequently, the information department of the MDP/CDE issued a communique in which it rejected "the statement that the identity, independence, and existence of the MDP/CDE depend on the type of alliance that is entered into, which, furthermore, only it has the prerogative to decide."

The communique points out that, as a political party, the MDP/CDE "bases itself on its own values, demonstrated over the last 12 years--values that naturally and necessarily place it in the convergence for a democratic alternative."

This public rejection of vassalage to the PCP's designs by the MDP/CDE had already been manifested in the Assembly of the Republic during the 25 April commemorations in Jose Manuel Torgarrinha's speech, which was practically ignored but which was significant in terms of the political relationship with other parties and strategies, specifically that of the Communists.

In an open criticism of the PCP's rather triumphalist (and revivalist) position, the MDP president pointed out: "The deep spiritual bonds between those who rose up against fascism have not been, nor will they be very easily extinguished. On the other hand, to carry that attitude from the past to the present is to seek to take up again conceptual and political instruments that, by being inappropriate, are inoperative."

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ARTICLE VIEWS PSD'S POLICY OF ALLIANCES

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 6 May 86 p 2

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice: "Which Alliance for the PSD (IV)?"]

[Text] The fourth and last article devoted to the question of the PSD's policy of alliances seeks to answer the question left open by the earlier ones: How to achieve the objective sought (a bloc dominated by the PSD, an alternative to the Socialist one, with majority support in the Assembly of the Republic, and without any type of pre-election coalition with joint slates at the national level)?

To respond to the foregoing question, it is well to bear in mind that it is not likely that the PSD could obtain majority support in the Assembly in a four-party system. But that possibility ceases to have those limitations in a five-party system, even with the present election system, provided that a 40-percent vote is obtained and that significant voting differences are not established among the remaining parties.

It is also well to bear in mind that the experience of the government, without majority support in the Assembly of the Republic, makes it possible to conclude that it is not unfeasible for a given government to achieve the essence of its policies, provided that easy alternatives are not formed in the parliamentary framework, and provided that the opposition parties feel that they have more to lose than to gain from the opening of a general crisis. But it is also obvious that this type of solution inevitably has the stamp of being provisional and increasingly unstable.

Finally, it is well not to forget that, as I stressed last week, the CDS is a preferential ally, basically the only party with which it would be feasible to establish joint slates if that were an appropriate strategy, because there are no basic objections of a permanent nature to such a strategic solution. That being the case, the question that presents itself in the framework of the current election system is that, on the one hand, a dynamic of supraparty unity has been rewarded by the Portuguese electorate but, on the other hand, the choice of an ED-type solution must be discarded for the combination of reasons I have already mentioned. What this means is that, in the capacity of a dominant party and clearly set apart from the other parties at this juncture, the PSD is forced to organize a strategic solution that will enable it to govern with the awareness that it cannot do so in isolation and locked

in its navel, but also with the clear idea that it must propose a political-electoral program capable of attracting the electorate, and correctly responding to the existing challenges and the reading that a party with the ideology of the PSD has of the solutions for such challenges or problems.

What this means is that it does not make sense for the PSD to negotiate a common program at the general staff level with another or other party forces (the AD was like that), but that it should prepare a political platform of modernization and reform that will be capable of moving social and electoral strata situated beyond the specific areas of control of the PSD, and to which other political forces can possibly subscribe.

What this means, therefore, is that the PSD must establish a contract of political membership and open it to social, political, and economic forces, naturally being able to modify it to improve and intensify it but always respecting the original philosophy characteristic of the plan that the PSD has for Portuguese society.

What this means is that, while the PSD should not make any alliance of national and general scope, and for that reason the PSD cannot or should not assume any commitment to negotiate the distribution of ministerial positions in terms of election percentages, there is nothing to prevent social forces or political groups outside of political parties from reaching agreement to also assume that platform of modernization and reform, and to prevent finding within the framework of each election circle (which, as is known, today is the district) the most appropriate solutions for the objectives which I began by enunciating --on the contrary, there is everything to justify it. What I mean to say by this is that there may be districts in which it is justifiable for the PSD and the CDS to present themselves to the electorate on joint slates, others in which it is normal for them to compete with one another, and others in which the PSD slates should contain an appreciable percentage of prestigious independents capable of attracting popular support. Which means that the alliances of coalitions will be natural and not artificial, the product of realism and pragmatism and not of a geometric spirit that levels everything in the name of abstractions.

It will be said, however, that what we are asking for with this strategy is a colonization area to be formed around the PSD and for the other parties or political forces, especially the CDS, to agree to surrender to the desires (or even the whims) of the PSD. That is not the case, nor could it be so. The fact is that politics does not take pity on unrealistic dreams, especially when the PSD will have a politician such as Adriano Moreira as leader of the CDS. If the PSD demands or tries to impose something beyond the threshold of tolerance of the CDS or any other political force, or if the solutions do not appropriately respond to the interests in question, the failure of the strategy will be obvious. However, that is not the question. The general run of apparent overall agreements are only expressions of local agreements.

Obviously, those who believe that the PSD should not have a dominant position such as the one it occupies in Portuguese society will not agree with this. But things are what they are and it would be better for them to drown their political sorrows somewhere else and stop upsetting the normal play of the relationship of forces and the community of objectives with unsatisfied desires.

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLL SHOWS OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR ENERGY, INDIFFERENCE TO POLICE

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 16-22 May 86 p 2

[Text] The Portuguese in the Greater Lisbon area are overtly opposed to the installation of nuclear power plants in our country and divided regarding the 2-year period for solving the delayed wages problem (too long, reasonable, or impossible to fulfill are the opinions given on an equal basis); and the majority are indifferent toward the Public Security Police [PSP]. These are some of the conclusions from a poll taken by Pluriteste strictly exclusive to O JORNAL.

Among the persons queried in the Greater Lisbon area, those of the female sex were found to be the ones expressing the greatest concern over the installation of that type of power plant in Portugal. Of all those asked about the feeling evoked among them by the PSP, it is noteworthy that "respect" is cited by 16.5 percent, and "confidence" by 12 percent. "Fear" or "suspicion" was the sentiment selected by 8 percent of those interviewed.

Chernobyl

One of the issues posed by the pollsters which gave a reminder of Chernobyl was: "Do you think that it will be possible in the near future to make use of nuclear energy without the risk of personal accidents?"

A total of 29.5 percent responded positively, and 62.5 percent, negatively; while 8 percent of those polled did not know or had no answer. From an age standpoint (over or under age 35), the responses are very close. The same thing does not hold true with regard to the sex of those interviewed: males answered "yes" by 40.4 percent, and "no" by 54.5 percent; while 18.8 percent of the females answered "yes" and 70.3 percent, "no."

The disparity between positive and negative responses is far greater when the question is couched in the following terms: "Prof Cavaco Silva has announced the installation of a nuclear power plant in Portugal over the medium term. What is your opinion regarding this matter?" Of those interviewed, 71 percent were opposed and 21.8 percent, in favor; while 7.3 percent did not know, or had no answer.

Wages in Arrears

"Prof Cavaco Silva has stated that the problem of the delayed wages would be solved within approximately 2 years. Do you consider that too long, long, reasonable, or a period of time impossible to fulfill?"

The answer most often repeated was "too long," with 37.3 percent; followed by "reasonable," with 30.3 percent, and "impossible to fulfill," with 30.8 percent. The men and those over 35 years of age who were queried opted primarily for "too long."

Indifferent Toward PSP

A final question dealt with a heated issue: "Do the Public Security Police evoke in you respect (16.5 percent), confidence (12), security (13.8), suspicion or fear (8), disrespect (7.5 percent), other (9), and "don't know" (1.3 percent).

The percentage of those who cited "indifference" turned out to be uneven between men and women (28.8 as opposed to 40.1 percent).

Technical Record

Direct, personal interviews with 400 persons in the Greater Lisbon region, selected on the basis of sex, age, and housing areas.

The margin of confidence offered by this survey is 95 percent, and the margin of error, 5 percent.

O JORNAL is responsible for the interpretation of the results.

2909

CSO: 3542/110

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PAPER REPORTS ON STATISTICS OF WEEKLIES' POPULARITY

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 16-22 May 86 p 4

[Excerpts] The most recent studies of media continue to rank O JORNAL in second place with regard to readers, among the leading general and political information weeklies.

According to the data gathered by Marktest for its "Bareme" (Regular Base for Media) during the 2-month interval of January-February, O JORNAL recorded 193,000 readers, as compared with 352,000 for EXPRESSO, 105,000 for SEMANARIO, and 101,000 for TEMPO; in a universe of 7.14 million individuals.

Norma's similar study, in turn, cited O JORNAL as having 211,000 regular readers (latest issue), in comparison with 459,000 for EXPRESSO, 103,000 for SEMANARIO, and 38,000 for TEMPO, with a universe of 7.987 million persons.

	Marktest *		Norma **	
EXPRESSO	352,000	4.9%	459,000	5.7%
O JORNAL	193,000	2.7%	211,000	2.6%
TAL & QUAL	118,000	1.7%	146,000	1.8%
SEMANARIO	105,000	1.5%	103,000	1.3%
TEMPO	101,000	1.4%	38,000	0.5%
O DIABO	98,000	1.4%	66,000	0.8%

* "Bareme" Jan-Feb 86, mean readership in a universe of 7.14 million individuals

** Media Study, Mar 86, readers of latest issue, in a universe of 7.987 million individuals

2909

CSO: 3542/110

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

EDITORIAL DEFENDS VERIFICATION ROLE OF POLL RESULTS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 May 86 p 6

[Editorial: "Predictions and Polls"]

[Excerpt] Opinion polls in the political realm always evoke two types of reaction: that of those who are benefited and that of those who emerge harmed. The former tend to overlook all the conditioning factors that could make the results relative; the latter, on the other hand, take shelter in their fallibility and cite past instances wherein they were challenged at the time that the votes cast at the polls were counted. Discounting the exaggerations, both may perhaps be somewhat correct. But the fact is that, in general, the polls are still the greatest barometer available to assess the approximate position of the electorate.

We already know that it is artificial to confront those queried, for example, with the hypothesis of there being elections now, at a time when most of the population would have a little more than vague notion of the motives that are currently prompting the politicians to operate seriously with such a hypothesis. However, it would be mistaken to imagine that the responses given under these circumstances mean nothing; because, as a general rule, those responses attest to suspicions which had been hovering in the air in one way or another. Moreover, if that were not the case, if the results were as absurd as some of those harmed claim, no one would even take the trouble to answer the queries or attach much value to them.

Like everything, the polls are what they are, and those published this weekend are no exception to the rule. If we view them carefully, there is nothing in their results which, at least tendentiously, has not already been empirically verified by many people. For example, it was already known that the popularity index of the government, and of the prime minister in particular, was high; that PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] was in worse circumstances than at the time of its scintillating entry into the political scene; that CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] could only reverse the downward curve on which it was embarking through a miracle; that PS [Socialist Party] was recovering; and that PC [Communist Party] has no reason to suspect that the same thing will happen to it. Polls, however, are intended to confirm: to confirm and to quantify.

2909

CSO: 3542/110

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CURRENT, PROJECTED ANTITANK WARFARE DOCTRINE ANALYZED

Preface

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 p 185

[Commentary by Lt Gen Hans-Henning von Sandrart, Army Chief of Staff:
"Defending Against Offensive Attack Forces"]

[Text] The constitution and the basic security conditions of the FRG determine the defense mission of the army: successful forward defense with all of its might--shoulder to shoulder with our allies--so that in the event of a national defense emergency it can hold its own territory, limit damage and gain the preconditions for a political solution to reestablish peace. The threat is characterized by the offensive strategy of the Warsaw Pact as well as by the dominant role of armored offensive forces in the action of allied weapons with strong air support. To carry out the mission, then, it is necessary for the army to defeat the armored offensive forces in mobile defense. In combat, all operations and tactical measures must concentrate on this main task. Consequently, this task is also a guideline for the armament of the army. The objective of this series of articles is to make clear to the reader the connections between the threat, one's own operational principles, army concepts and technology and to present the contribution of armament in the fulfillment of the army's mission.

'Ground Forces System' Concept

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 186,187

[Article: "Defending Against Armored Offensive Forces Through the "Army System: System Thinking Displaces Duel Thinking"]

[Text] The concept "army system" and the statement "system thinking displaces duel thinking" have been permanent elements of the discussion of late, among other things on the interaction between technological development and the conduct of operations. The thinking of the military leaders is being influenced by this more and more. Just as individual weapon systems have become increasingly complex but all the more effective, the army is also in a process of change. Thus the introduction of up-to-date sensors, means of data

transmission and processing, and intelligent ammunition and the increase in penetration performance affect not only the combat effectiveness of individual weapon systems but also the combat effectiveness of the army as a whole.

One can represent the system mentality through the example of the defense against armored offensive forces. In this introductory article, there is to be no discussion of the details on the threat, our conduct of operations, or the concept of the army; this is reserved for the following articles. Rather, it is to be made clear how the different reconnaissance, command, and weapon systems can be utilized in a sequence of individual coordinated steps so as to be successful in warding off armored offensive forces.

We are also addressing the military hardware that will be introduced into the army in the near future, for its development was very substantially influenced by the overall system thinking. Naturally there should be no attempt here to give any firm instructions to the troop commanders. Every operation has its own dynamics.

The influence of air forces, missiles, airborne units, means of electronic warfare and possibly of the defense against chemical agents is present everywhere at all times and affects combat. It is ignored in the following to simplify the presentation but the elements that determine it are integrated into the army system.

If one views the introduction of a second echelon of armored offensive forces that is to continue the attack beyond the stopped first echelon, then one sees the following steps in defending against it.

Reconnaissance in the Depth

Armored offensive forces--essentially battle tanks, armored personnel carriers and self-propelled howitzers--must be brought up from the depth before they can be put into action. In a first step, then, it must be determined which of these forces are brought up when and where. Precise reconnaissance of the enemy was always a precondition for success in combat but the possibilities for doing so were limited because attackers used the natural cover of the terrain in their advance and approach. With the utilization of the third dimension as well as up-to-date sensors and data transmission in real time, the situation has changed decisively. Reconnaissance drones--the first robots on the modern battlefield--make it possible for the defender to scout enemy offensive forces while they are still in the depth. They reduce what has been a substantial advantage of an attacker--surprise.

Situation Assessment

With the introduction of reconnaissance drones and modern electronic reconnaissance, there has been an abrupt increase in the amount of information available to the commanders and their staffs to assess the situation. If the acquired advantage is to be used effectively, then this flood of information

must be properly directed, processed and presented. This is possible only by utilizing the most up-to-date communications and data processing technology.

Heros, the army command information system for the computer-assisted conduct of operations in the staffs, therefore works closely with the reconnaissance and other command information systems. With its help, the tactical command can decide quickly which measures must be taken first to engage detected armored offensive forces. It is important to use the time that the attacker requires for his advance and approach. Of great importance, therefore, is not only the rapid formulation of decisions but also the immediate transmission of the resulting orders. Our communications systems make this possible. Their development will not only accelerate the flow of information but also make it more resistant against jamming measures and more secure cryptologically.

The situation assessment is repeated at the different command levels in the course of the enemy's advance and approach as the result or initiator of the next steps.

Electronic Warfare Against the Enemy Command

The bringing up and introduction of fresh forces is a procedure that requires high command performance. To interfere with it is an important early measure in defending against armored offensive forces. Through electronic warfare, it is possible to act rapidly, purposefully and in a concentrated manner and it can make it difficult for the enemy to gain attack momentum.

Inhibiting the Movement of the Enemy in the Depth

With the introduction of the MLRS multiple rocket launcher and the associated antitank mine launcher, it becomes possible to hinder and channel the movements of the enemy's forces while they are still in great depth. To be sure, the expended mine barriers cannot be monitored by direct-fire weapons but allowing the planned movement to come up and harassing it gains time, makes it difficult for the enemy to coordinate the operations of his forces, and facilitates their engagement through the long-range rocket artillery.

Target Acquisition

Combat reconnaissance, reconnaissance results of the drones, direction-finding bearings of electronic warfare, and inflight reports of the air force continually update the situation information on the enemy. This knowledge is completed through the precise results of target acquisition. Radar equipment as well as remotely piloted vehicles for target acquisition make possible the real-time engagement of point targets and reduce the expenditure of ammunition.

Attrition Through Indirectly Aimed Fire

Bomblet ammunition and, in the future, homing ammunition make possible the engagement of moving armored targets through indirectly aimed fire as well.

It is a matter of wearing down the enemy as early as possible with rocket and tube artillery during his approach and of slowing his movements. His attack momentum must not begin to develop and the cohesion of his conduct of operations must be disrupted even before entering combat.

Armored Combat Reconnaissance

Early, before the enemy reaches his own defense areas, he must be scouted through armored reconnaissance patrols--comprised of armored reconnaissance vehicles, battle tanks or armored personnel carriers--without or without a combat mission depending upon the situation. Their reports on the strength and organization of forces as well as on the focal point of the impending attack are the basis for last orders and measures by the troop commander to prepare the defense with directly aimed fire. Interference-proof and cryptologically protected radio contacts are essential preconditions for the effectiveness of the combat reconnaissance and the utilization of its results.

Neutralization of the Enemy Artillery

The attack of armored forces is preceded by the preparation fire of the enemy artillery. It is supposed to destroy or at least hold down special antitank forces. In this phase, it is a matter of reducing its effect as much as possible. That means that its gun emplacements must be reconnoitered quickly and precisely with our own artillery locating means and be worked immediately with our own fire. The time factor plays an especially important role in the engagement of the enemy artillery. With the introduction of an artillery command, information and fire control system, the results of the target acquisition means and other reconnaissance results are converted into fire immediately. In this way, the main fire support of the attacking armored units can be neutralized quickly.

Barriers Immediately in Front of the Defense Areas

The enemy tanks again stack up immediately in front of the defense areas. The movement of the enemy is again hindered by mine barriers laid in time manually or with mine launchers in combat as well as by the use of antitank directional mines. Here, in contrast to the barriers in the depth, however, direct-fire weapons as well as artillery monitor the barriers. This moment of the stacking up of enemy tank forces and of the new situation assessment by the attacker's commanders must be utilized immediately. The actual defensive combat begins in this phase. Here it is especially clear why the blocking capability is becoming an element equal in importance to fire and movement.

Containment Through Directly Aimed Fire

In the next step, it is imperative to contain the offensive forces through the concentrated fire of the directly-aimed weapons. Battle is engaged with the long-range antitank guided missiles of the tank destroyers and enters into its crucial phase with the fire of the battle tanks and armored personnel carriers. More than ever, it is important that

- the enemy tank be detected before it detects its target,
- our first round or missile hits its target before the enemy tank fires,
- the hit has such an effect on the target that the enemy is neutralized.

Rapid Formation of Antitank Focal Points

The attacker will use his advantage of being free to employ his forces as he chooses for a massed concentration. To prevent penetration or breakthrough situations, it must be possible to form antitank focal points quickly. In the operational framework, the most suitable weapon systems for this are the antitank helicopters. Their employment is an effective and highly valuable means of taking care of a critical situation. In the tactical area, however, it is still the battle tank through which an antitank force can be quickly concentrated at a crucial point even under enemy zone fire and through which one can act from a meeting engagement. Precisely under the frequently changing situations in modern defensive combat, therefore, the battle tank will remain indispensable in the future as well.

Destruction of Tank Forces

The final step in the defense of armored offensive forces is their destruction in front of and in the defense areas. Through forceful surprise counterattacks, the already wornout enemy must be repulsed through battle tank units. In this way, the defender regains the initiative at least locally and acts instead of reacts. This operation can be carried out quickly. Only through it is the defensive operation decided precisely relative to the enemy's main point of attack.

Control of the System

Only a part of the "army system" was addressed in the example "Defense Against Armored Offensive Forces. If one considers that only a small sector of an ongoing battle was illuminated and that additionally many other operations take place at the same time, for which forces, space and time must be utilized in the best possible manner, then one receives an impression of the complexity of the "army system." If one also considers that previously static elements--mine warfare, for example--become dynamic through the use of up-to-date technologies, that reaction times are being reduced drastically, and that

mobility and ranges of weapon systems are continually increasing, then it becomes abundantly clear that every effort must be made to see that this system remains controllable especially in extraordinary situations. One must thereby consider system structures, interfaces, information availability, transmission and processing, time constants, combat effectiveness factors, logistical ranges and similar factors. Modern communications and information technology gives us the means for doing this. Only through its consistent utilization can one be sure that the military commanders can maintain control of their respective subsystems of the "army system" and ultimately be successful in doing their part, along with their units, in the main task of the army, defending against armored offensive forces.

Warsaw Pact Threat Analyzed

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 188-191

[Article: "The Threat: The Offensive As a Main Type of Combat"]

[Text] "The ground forces...possess the necessary combat characteristics for resolute battle against a powerful enemy in the land theaters of war. Their main task will be to exploit the results of the nuclear weapon strikes of the rocket troops and the air forces for the final destruction of the enemy groupings in the theaters of war, to capture (or to occupy) the territory of the countries of the enemy coalition quickly, and to end the war on the continent victoriously." (Footnote) ("Military Strategy," published by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, (third Russian edition, Moscow, 1968), German edition published in Cologne, 1969, p 383)

In accordance with the Soviet command and operational principles that are binding for all Warsaw Pact armed forces, the modern combat of ground forces is combat of combined arms. Participating in it are units and formations of all service branches of the ground forces, combat pilot and attack helicopter formations of the air forces and, in the case of engagements in areas near the coast, also surface naval combat formations of the naval forces.

Maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact armed forces show again and again that this principle is definitely being carried out in reality. The joint command of the ground and air forces is being applied consistently even down to the army level. The spatially and temporally coordinated utilization of munitions, among other things to exploit successes, to eliminate crises, or to shift the main effort quickly, can easily be practiced in this manner. Fire and movement as well as electronic warfare are basic contents of all operations.

The Offensive

The Soviet military doctrine designates the offensive as the main type of combat. When pushed with firm determination and at a rapid pace, it is supposed to guarantee the total destruction of the enemy in the combat of combined weapons.

The offensive shows the following characteristics: the offensive forces are organized in echelons and freely available reserves. This structure occurs at every level of command. The first echelon includes half to two-thirds of all combat and combat support troops of a unit. It is to force penetration into the enemy defense. The breakthrough and the thrust into the depth is taken over by the following forces of the second echelon. Freely available reserves are employed to clean up crises or to exploit situations what were not foreseen by the operations plan.

In addition, the capability of the armored formations for combat with combined weapons, supported by helicopters and fighter bombers, permits their purposeful employment independent of the main forces but coordinated with their offensive success to exploit unexpected situational developments for the engagement of reserves and installations in the depth.

In the offensive, after extensive preparation fire and with immediate support by artillery, fighter bombers and attack helicopters, armored formations are to penetrate the enemy defense areas. Generally organized narrowly in depth and protected by a dense antiaircraft shield, they are supposed to break through the defense areas quickly and destroy the reservists.

Nuclear delivery systems, command posts, antitank systems and artillery formations of the enemy are always engaged as a matter of priority.

Through airborne operations of forces in battalion to division strength, key terrain in the depth of the enemy territory is to be captured early, enemy reserves contained, and the command capability of the enemy reduced, thereby establishing the preconditions for the rapid advance of the main forces.

The military leaders of the Warsaw Pact states are trained so that they will no longer attempt to mount a rigid assault against the enemy defense. Instead, they are to look for the weaknesses of the enemy and outflank him or attack him in the rear. Movement and combat alternate. When necessary, the troops are regrouped quickly and flexibly. Through the alternation of deployment and contraction of forces, the NBC weapons of the enemy are to be underrun but, at the same time, adequately strong forces can always be organized for the decisive breakthrough.

Course of the Offensive

As a rule, the offensive from movement is waged over forces that have already reached the enemy. The preceding advance begins in a marshalling area that is about 40 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area and thus beyond the field of fire of the mass of the enemy artillery.

In advance of the main forces move the combat support forces such as artillery, engineers, air defense units, and possibly also tank destroyer units that monitor the offensive from favorable positions.

The preparation fire through artillery and air forces begins even during the advance of the main forces. The enemy defense and firing areas are subjected

to the greatest employment of ammunition for 30 to 40 minutes. With this uninterrupted fire, the intention is to affect the defender psychologically as well as materially.

As soon as the fire is shifted to the depth of the enemy combat zone, the offensive of the armored combat forces begins. The enemy should be given no time to overcome his shock and to put his defensive weapons into operation.

The "line of the initial assault position" is crossed without halting. Only at night is a short halt allowed for orientation.

The terrain sector up to the enemy positions is crossed with the greatest possible speed. The battle tanks roll ahead and the motorized riflemen follow dismounted. In this phase, tanks and armored personnel carriers keep the enemy down through direct fire with a high rate of fire.

Enemy mine barriers are cleared either with the resources of the combat forces or with the support of the engineers. Penetration occurs under the fire of all weapons. It is to be followed by the final destruction of the enemy in the forward positions. Subsequently tanks and the motorized riflemen, who have once again mounted their armored personnel carriers, attempt to push forward into the gaps in the defender's battle disposition so as to bring about a rapid widening of the penetration. Through a determined forward push, the cohesion of the defense is to be broken up and possibilities created for the offensive on the flanks and in the rear of the enemy. In this way, the forces mounting a frontal attack are to receive help in achieving success.

Finally, the second echelon introduced into combat is to break through the enemy defense system and push forward to the objective in the depth.

The attack forces must at all times be prepared to continue the combat under NBC conditions. After the enemy has "unleashed" a nuclear war--so the official Soviet statement--the use of its own nuclear weapons and the timely and effective exploitation of their effect becomes a "task of paramount importance" for all commanders. A similar assessment is probably in force for the existing chemical agents.

Uniformity of Training and Equipment

Uniform training and equipment are the basis for the realization of this offensive concept. The armed forces of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have organizational forms that are largely adapted to the Soviet model. Their weapons and equipment come primarily from Soviet production or are reproduced under license, whereby it frequently happens that essential parts are delivered from the Soviet Union. That strengthens the Soviet position of leadership and supremacy and guarantees a highly developed technology. In addition, uniform equipment makes possible rational warehousing and reciprocal material support in operations.

Military principles and norms are being standardized continuously to make it possible to work with generally valid values at all command levels in the rapidly developing combat.

The high military commanders of all Warsaw Pact countries complete a course of study at the academy of the Soviet general staff and qualified officers of the middle command echelon attend academies of the service branches of the Soviet armed forces. This common training is supposed to ensure a uniform intellectual foundation that includes both the military tools as well as the political orientation. The fact that they know one another simplifies the command of the major formations even across national borders. Otherwise, the training and advanced training of the officers of the Warsaw Pact armed forces carried out within a national framework and likewise oriented toward the Soviet model is very practical.

Three-fourths of the rank and file and noncommissioned officers of the Warsaw Pact ground forces are draftees. Along with the most up-to-date equipment, they are decisive in determining the combat capability of the formations. They are brought up from kindergarten on with the idea that their fatherland and its "socialist achievements" are continuously threatened by the imperialist powers in the West. In this way, the will to defend and hatred for the Western nations are awakened early. Neither individual expressions of discontent about the existing political system and domestic crises nor problems with nationalities in the multinational country Soviet Union ought to obscure the fact that as soldiers they would risk their lives with conviction in the event of war.

The military training of the young people begins in school, where military themes permeate all subjects. At the age of 15 to 17, they go through a premilitary training. The boys are thereby prepared specifically for their later application in the armed forces and the girls are prepared for service in civil defense.

The field training in the Warsaw Pact armed forces is hard and realistic. It is carried out under general conditions that by Western standards are unbelievably restrictive and psychologically stressful on the individual. Still, the oppression of the individual in the armed forces is merely a more intense form of the regimentation to which all people are subjected throughout their lives under communist rule.

The view that Soviet soldiers in particular would not be able to react flexibly to surprise situations in combat because of this patronizing is contradicted by their solid practical military training, various tactical modes of behavior that have been drilled into them, and their ability to improvise.

Relative Force Capabilities for Central Europe

For use in Central Europe, that is directed against the FRG and the NATO armed foes stationed in there, the Warsaw Pact has a total of 92 combat divisions.

Of these, 56 divisions stand ready in the GDR, CSSR and Poland as the first echelon. They include national and Soviet forces.

As the second echelon or reserve, another 36 divisions are counted in the three western military districts of the Soviet Union. Added to these are artillery divisions and other independent major formations.

The equipment of the rapidly available forces of the Warsaw Pact in Europe includes almost 27,000 battle tanks, 19,000 guns, 18,400 antitank guided missile systems, and 53,000 armored combat vehicles.

If one relates this potential to the NATO resources, namely to the approximately 13,470 battle tanks, 11,000 guns, 12,300 antitank guided missile systems, and 33,000 armored combat vehicles, then NATO's numerical inferiority in all areas becomes clear. Naturally, one could say that the Warsaw Pact would not risk an attack with a superiority of 2:1. If one considers, however, that the attacker, depending upon his intentions, has the possibility of greatly concentrating his forces whereas the defender must be present along the entire front, then it is evident that a superiority can easily be achieved at points of main effort that by no means excludes the possibility of an offensive.

NATO's disadvantage in central Europe is increased through the lack of spatial depth. This circumstance forbids allowing large losses of territory, because large parts of the population and of the economic potential of the FRG would thereby fall into the hands of the enemy.

But the NATO formations on the battlefield are opposed not only by the ground forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. These forces receive substantial support from the air. Attack and transport helicopter formations, which are already assigned to the armies in peacetime, intervene directly in the combat. They are destined for antitank operations and for the transport of motorized riflemen. Operational aircraft of the Warsaw Pact air forces are likewise temporarily attached directly to the fronts and armies for certain missions.

Technical Developments for the Combat Forces

The tactical concept of highly mobile combat by day or night and the threat from weapons of the NATO armed forces, as seen by the Soviet Union, is also reflected in the technical development of the vehicles of the armored offensive forces.

The following trends are seen in the development of the modern battletanks:

--Transition to a three-man crew and introduction of an automatic loader. In connection with ergonomic restrictions and the carrying of part of the fuel outside of the armor protection, this measure allows the Soviets to construct vehicles that have an enclosed volume about 3 square meters smaller than Western developments. On the one hand, the clearly smaller silhouette makes detection and engagement of the tanks more difficult and, on the other hand, it permits a substantial armor protection with overall weights of under 45

tons. The automatic loader relieves the crew in handling the relatively heavy ammunition, permits the stowing of the ammunition protected on the hull floor in the middle of the tank, and ensures a high rate of fire. The disadvantage of the smaller negative range of elevation of the main gun connected with the flat construction is thereby accepted.

--The 125-mm smooth-bore gun is standard armament of all modern Soviet battle tanks. The large caliber, the high initial velocity, and the continuous improvement of the high-explosive, shaped-charge and kinetic-energy projectiles are now ensuring the Soviets superiority in the effect of the ammunition on the target.

--The hit probability was decisively increased through the installation of laser rangefinders, improvements in the weapon stabilization and the fire control systems, and the extremely flat trajectory of the high-velocity ammunition.

--Mobility was improved through the gradual raising of the engine output to over 15 kilowatts per ton and the change from a wheeled track and suspension to track support rollers. The capability to drive under water has been standard up to now. It can not yet be judged whether this capability has been retained for the T-80 as well.

--The protection of the crew was improved through design engineering, quality of the armor steel, and the structure of the armor itself with the objective of protecting the crews to the range at which their own armament can destroy Western battle tanks. The introduction of laminated armor thereby contributed to a substantial improvement in the protection. An additional layer to improve the protection against neutron radiation is an integral part of all modern tanks. It is to be expected that the Soviets are carefully evaluating the Israeli experiences with reactive additional armor.

In the case of the armored personnel carriers, the transition from the BMP-1 to the BMP-2 shows how technology reacts to tactical changes. The new 30-mm rapid-fire gun permits more accurate fire at greater ranges than the previous 73-mm low-pressure gun. In addition, a caliber was chosen here as well that is superior to that of comparable NATO vehicles. Through the installation of special optics, the engagement of air targets is possible and thus consideration is given to the increase in attack helicopters in the West.

Tendencies toward more effective mounted action from the vehicle are seen, among other places, in the possibility of installing a fourth machine gun as well as in reducing the dismounted strength by two soldiers. The Soviets are equipping their armored personnel carriers with up-to-date antitank guided missile systems with engagement possibilities of up to 4,000 meters for use against battle tanks.

It can be stated that the combat forces of the Warsaw Pact armed forces are increasingly being equipped with vehicles whose technical capabilities fulfill the prerequisites for the realization of the tactical concepts.

Despite the requirement for firepower that is clearly in the foreground, Soviet vehicles represent a good compromise between the in part conflicting requirements for firepower, protection, mobility and a command capability. Besides some noteworthy work of their own, as in the construction of guns, the Soviets react rapidly to developments in the West. Detailed publications of the Western press and the possibility of buying the needed technology will make it easier for them to make the changeover from their heretofore mainly actively operating night vision equipment to thermal imagers in the near future and also to improve the fire control computers.

For the end of the 1990's, one can expect the introduction of a new generation of battle tanks. In addition to the adaptation of firepower, protection and mobility to the latest technology, special measures can be expected that make more difficult the detection of the tank through infrared and radar sensors and increase the protection against self-guiding ammunition aimed from above. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will thereby retain the existing turret tank concept or will turn to such revolutionary solutions as crown mounts or turretless tanks.

Overall Evaluation

Along with the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies, the Soviet ground and air forces in Europe have a tremendous firepower that by Western concepts far exceeds defense requirements. One must thereby acknowledge that Soviet equipment is up-to-date and of good quality. It is continuously being adapted to the development of Soviet operational principles and to the threat by enemy weapon systems. The high share of military expenditures in the budget of the Soviet Union allows the planners and procurers to coordinate their activities in several areas at the same time. This is verified by the improvements in the battle tanks and armored personnel carriers and the simultaneous increase in the artillery and helicopter forces in the last 15 years.

The purposeful concentration of forces and the uniformity of training, equipment and command are doubtless among the advantages of the Eastern doctrine. The dominance of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact facilitates the achievement of agreement. Nevertheless, national ways of thinking are not stifled but are frequently taken into consideration in policy decisions.

In the evaluation of the maneuvers and publications of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, a trend is becoming evident that--made possible, among other things, through the extensive provisioning with materials--indicates a greater capability of regiments and battalions for independent and self-responsible action. Support through the respective higher command echelon with resources required by the assigned mission facilitates the tasks of the commanders concerned.

For all that, an overlapping command structure equipped with redundant command resources ensures that the cohesive conduct of operations can be maintained in the event of surprise attacks.

Combined Arms Antitank Mission

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 192-195

[Article: "Antitank Defense in the Combat of Combined Weapons"]

[Text] "Modern combat is primarily a fight against armored forces." Thus begins the regulation ZDv 3/50 under the heading: "Antitank Defense--Joint Task of all Troops." This call for action is indeed the key to success against the superiority in armored forces of the Warsaw Pact that was presented in the preceding article, "The Threat." The current antitank defense concept is to be presented through a few brief selected considerations.

The Conditions

In the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact, the military mission of the army requires the defense of our country within the scope of the alliance. The army, along with the other military services and the alliance partners, must thereby

--contain the attacker near the border and destroy his strike forces,

--prevent him from proceeding with the offensive according to plan and nourishing it with fresh forces from the depth, and

--recover our own captured terrain from him.

Besides the defense in the combat sectors assigned to it by the NATO commanding generals, the army faces a second large task: ensuring the freedom to maneuver in the rear areas for their own and all other NATO armed forces on the soil of the FRG.

It follows from this double task--forward defense and the maintenance of the freedom to maneuver in the rear areas--that in a state of defense the German Army must have at its disposal two large components with different structures and equipment: a field army and a territorial army. It also follows that the operational principles must be optimized to the different tasks. This article is restricted to the field army, which is especially structured and equipped for engaging tanks.

The area influences the conduct of operations in many ways. The military strategic concept of forward defense, the will to limit damage, and the small depth of the area affect the possibilities in operational planning as well as the place and type of terrain use by highly mobile formations and weapon systems. The increase in builtup terrain through further settlement channels movements and limits the possibilities for the full deployment of tanks for attacker and defender. Cover and camouflage, on the other hand, are favored and possibilities for barriers are improved. The narrowness of the area

creates more positions at shorter combat distances. The quality of the road network and agricultural measures open up possibilities for movement even where previously the ground trafficability kept mechanized forces away.

The result is that the mission of the field army requires as the essential performance the successful conduct and continuation of four battles that interlock and are occurring simultaneously or that succeed one another:

--The battle on a wide front and with great intensity from the beginning in the scope of sustained delaying operations.

--The battle around and in the defense areas of brigades and divisions as a battle of combined arms in a mobile conduct of operations, including the employment of division reserves, with the goal of stopping and defeating the first echelon of the enemy armies.

--The battle against looming penetrations or breakthroughs in the primarily offensive employment of assembled reserves and/or of operational reserves from the front in a free operation that cannot be planned in advance with the goal of defeating and repulsing forces of the first echelon here at the latest and of restoring the integrity of its own territory.

--During these three battles, it is a matter of carrying the fight into the depth with reconnaissance and fire from the beginning to delay and wear down the second echelon so that the first and second echelons can be defeated one after another and separately.

The field army must be able to resolve these tasks. The destruction of attacking tanks is thereby in the foreground of all considerations and measures. The operations plan is therefore an extremely dynamic antitank plan.

The enemy's capability of carrying on uninterrupted operations is countered through the technical and tactical combination. To that end, highly mobile elements of antitank defense are to be employed flexibly. Our own capabilities for the conducting of the combat of combined weapons are also transferred to levels that are felt on the battlefield quickly and without a lot of staff work. For this reason, units and formations are the supporters of the antitank battle.

Tactical operational principles consider in advance the factors of mission and area shown above. The "antitank defense mission" common to all service branches is converted into procedures that reveal the enemy's weaknesses in technology, tactics and command and lead to the destruction of his forces. The objective is to hinder the systematic cooperation of the enemy forces, to force the individual weapon systems to expose themselves at vulnerable points, and to neutralize them through the hit with the first shot.

The Combat of Combined Weapons

The Significance

"Through the cooperation of different service branches under unified command, it (the combat) becomes combat of combined weapons" (AnwFE [instruction for command and operations] 700/108 No 103). This means the systematic division of labor, planned overlapping and situation-appropriate replenishment of the different forces and resources as well as the orientation of all efforts toward the objectives of the respective operations.

This orientation is the destruction of armored offensive forces. Thus the combat of combined weapons should not be understood as a mere description or course of action but as a challenge to apply a concept consistently. The basic idea thereby is to hit and defeat the enemy again and again at an unexpected time, unexpected place and in an unexpected manner. That requires initiative, especially at the command levels brigade to division.

Combat Elements

The main elements of combat are fire and movement. In combination with barriers, they determine the success in antitank defense.

With the expected enemy fire density, movements are made more difficult even under armor protection. On the other hand, high fire concentration forces movements so as to be able to maintain and utilize the combat capability at the crucial point. This requires the planning of areas without barriers or the use of rapid barriers with limited effective times as well as the exploitation of all cover offered by the terrain for movements and fire protection.

It is not so much the high density of our own fire that determines success or failure in antitank defense but the hit scored with the corresponding effect on the most important target. The frequency of "the hit with the first shot" is decisive.

Seen in this light, command maneuverability is a decisive element in combat.

The Contribution of the Service Branches to Antitank Defense

The army possesses efficient forces for the engagement of armored offensive troops: service branches that--each seen individually--can fulfill subtasks of an operation under the principles just described with ever greater prospects of success. The following description dispenses with the enumeration of all service branches:

--The command forces establish the technical preconditions for a maneuverable command. They support the conduct of operations through the provision of reconnaissance results and can quickly determine the point of main effort as

well as the direction of movements of armored forces. Through electronic countermeasures, they can help to deceive the enemy, to paralyze his offensive power, and thus to hinder the orderly interaction of his forces.

--The combat forces are the main supporters of the combat of combined weapons:

Unarmored combat forces carry on the infantry fight against infantry reinforced with tanks in heavily covered terrain with many obstacles. Their primary task is to carry on combat in and around localities, in woods and around waters to free armored combat forces for other tasks or, as defensive pillars, to hold an area for later operations of armored combat forces. In field fortifications, they utilize terrain sectors to back up enemy armored forces or to channel them so as to create the preconditions for the mobile use of armored combat forces. Through the skillful emplacement of long-range antitank weapons in combination with the fortification of merging localities supplemented through the dominant effect there of the panzerfaust, they clear the way, hold territory and make it possible for the armored combat forces to conduct mobile operations at a promising location. Through infiltration or harassment, they are especially well suited to surprising enemy tanks in close combat and to hindering the orderly advance of battle tank formations in assembly areas or in passing through localities and defiles. They thus establish the preconditions for the use of other, including weaker, forces and resources.

The airmobile combat forces are an essential means to contain enemy tanks quickly with strong antitank forces, protect flanks, close gaps, and capture important localities, defiles or bridges in surprise raids or in rapid operations. For this purpose, they are to receive special support and they are to be given the opportunity through extra time or utilization in builtup terrain to protect themselves or to dig in. Precisely in the case of rapidly developing operations, the formation of insular positions, or the impending loss of the cohesion in their own conduct of operations, airborne formations are well suited to serve as supporting pillars in the fight against armored enemy forces and thus as an effective means for regaining the initiative.

As the core of the army, the armored combat forces have the task of engaging and defeating the mechanized enemy through fire and movement at close and medium distances. High firepower, mobility and adequate armor protection allow them to alternate immediately between dispersion and concentration and between offensive thrusts, firefights from emplacements, and the slow fighting retreat, to reach the enemy quickly, and to pull back from the effects of superior fire through rapid movement into more favorable operating areas. Through a mixture of antitank forces adapted to the situation and terrain, the armored enemy can be overpowered even in areas that are only conditionally suitable for the employment of armored forces.

Armored and armored infantry forces cooperate very closely to overpower the enemy. Surprise attacks with fire and thrusts, if possible in the flank and rear, lend force to the movements. It is important especially for them to plan the antitank defense so that they intervene in the combat at the decisive time and at the right place in the most expedient organization. This is all the more important when visibility is restricted, where they can utilize the

modern thermal-image observation and sighting devices as a highly effective means of engaging armored targets to their own advantage.

The armored reconnaissance force obtains reconnaissance results with technical means and through scouting so that, if need be through combat or "letting themselves be overrun," the direction and focal point of enemy armored attacks are determined and reported to make it possible to take antitank measures appropriate to the time and situation. Through their reconnaissance results, the course is set for a "battle formation" and they make possible the crafty use of the main forces at the focal point and predetermine the success in the antitank defense.

Tank destroyer units fight with great mobility, generally on a broad front, and utilize the superior range of their weapon systems for a hit lead. They are therefore especially dependent upon reconnaissance results and always have priority in the choice of positions among the combat forces. Accuracy of fire and long range give them special weight in antitank defense. All terrain possibilities must always be investigated with respect to the success of the employment of tank destroyer units. Especially in cooperation with long-range support weapons, they can establish the preconditions for flanking attacks by their own forces at the point of main effort. Combat forces achieve the greatest effect only in close interaction with each other and with the combat support forces.

--The combat support forces act against armored forces through fire, especially at long ranges, obtain reconnaissance and scouting results, set up barriers, give support in overcoming obstacles, and carry on the fight against the enemy aircraft.

The artillery force locates targets and, by monitoring the battlefield, it provides information on the battle disposition, movements and strength of the enemy. It contains enemy forces in the depth as well, breaks them up, especially where they are backed up, and helps to stop them. The artillery must take part early in the fight against tanks. Through smoke and high-explosive fire as well as temporary barriers, it can contribute to the defeat of the armored enemy. By engaging the artillery of the enemy and neutralizing his observation, it prevents our own combat forces from being "covered up" with fire. It thus helps to see that antitank guided missiles can be fired accurately. The artillery can temporally change the battlefield to a limited extent with mine missiles for the laying of barrier minefields. It is thus an effective means for the rapid shifting of focal points, especially for antitank defense. It has a decisive influence on the mobile combat tactics of the armored combat forces, especially when coordinated with the engineers.

Engineers do not only interdict, they frequently make possible movements for the engagement of tanks. Especially the capability of reacting quickly with antitank mortar mines during combat and--when necessary--with varying effective times helps to change the battlefield in accordance with our own concepts so that it is especially favorable to our own conduct of operations. It is not a matter of reacting to enemy operations with the available means but of forcing him to react as intended by our own side.

Armored air defense forces primarily protect the formations of the combat forces employed at the point of main effort or assembled as reserves. It is they who make at all possible the mobile conduct of operations by day.

The NBC defense force provides for rapid decontamination far forward and helps make possible combat against armored forces under NBC conditions as well.

The logistic troops establish the material preconditions for combat and for its successful outcome.

But it must also be said that these forces are scarce in terms of their number relative to the threat and their mission and that there are shortcomings that must be eliminated.

The Third Dimension

The great width, shortage of forces and small depth of the defense areas require the utilization of the third dimension against the enemy's main attack forces. Antitank helicopters therefore strengthen antitank defense in all types of combat. Their early employment will effectively support the operations of the combat forces through the full utilization of their antitank guided missiles. They are a crucial means for the strengthening of the antitank defense and for shifting the point of main effort of antitank operations over great distances and are thus "the operational means for clearing up a critical situation."

Air forces can act in the enemy's depth, to cordon off the battlefield, and to give immediate support against attacks by armored forces. They are especially needed where army forces cannot adequately perform the main task of tank engagement: preventing the timely intervention of the second echelon. The importance of the use of airborne forces was already described above.

Antitank Defense of All Forces

The panzerfaust is a frequently underestimated means of antitank defense. It is used on a broad front, to be sure, but as a "pawn" it does not play a large role. In the planned equipment and through its large numbers, it has a substantial part in the destruction of enemy tanks.

From the protection of buildings and field fortifications, all forces so equipped destroy attacking tanks in close combat and wear down such "bold thrusts" through "numerous hits."

The Brigades in Combat

The conduct of operations of the brigades is a decisive precondition for antitank defense. The brigade is already organically capable of conducting operations of combined arms. With reinforcements appropriate to the situation and flexible command and through expedient mixing of the combat forces, the

most suitable commitment of forces can in each case be found for the engagement of the enemy. It is the task of the commanders to plan, coordinate and lead the interaction of forces, whereby in the foreground of all considerations is the understanding of the fight against tanks as requiring initiative. In this connection, command ingenuity is seen in the use of the service branches in each case in accordance with their strength and without a model. In the following, some possible examples for:

--Systematic division of labor: Armored infantrymen hold territory in terrain with many obstacles and are reinforced for antitank defense through tanks and tank destroyer units. The artillery thereby blinds the respective secondary targets and neutralizes the observation of the offensive forces that can hinder its own forces in the effective use of their weapons.

--Overlapping according to plan: Artillery and engineers complement one another ideally with their barrier resources. Engagement areas of the combat forces overlap so that flanking fire is possible at all times, even in the neighboring combat sector. Reconnaissance units complement each other to the extent that a complete view of the situation emerges and fire can be planned very precisely to achieve the respective hit leads.

--Replenishment appropriate to the situation: In utilizing reserves, the area foreseen for an offensive is to be kept free of barriers but made especially secure. Thus, for example, engineers or artillery are to be kept in readiness so as to hold back offensive forces quickly or possibly temporarily with antitank mortar mines or mine missiles to destroy them with a powerful thrust in the flank and rear. If own attacks or barriers are planned, the clearing of lanes for the bringing forward of counteroffensive forces can be monitored through the mine launchers of the engineers, for example, so as to be able to close them again quickly in the event of a surprise enemy attack.

--The orientation of all efforts toward the objective of each combat operation: The courage for a clear massed concentration is required here. All forces are to be employed so that the decisive thrust against the armored forces of the enemy is aimed where the enemy is to be weakened the most. In so doing, the gaining of the initiative at all levels is of decisive importance.

All in all, it is a matter of forcing our own operational concept on the enemy. The brigades, reinforced in accordance with the situation, are very well suited for this.

Conclusions

Every change or modernization of the enemy forces must be examined to see what influence it has on our own capabilities for mission accomplishment. If necessary, countermeasures must be taken. The mission analyzed at the outset of these comments makes clear how numerous the tasks of the field army are in the state of defense. This requires a set of instruments that are well sharpened and fully available for the necessary operations. If some instrument or other has become dull or is missing entirely, then it must be

renewed or acquired. But if the exchange of the entire set of instruments is necessary because the overall conditions change, then even a proven concept must be rethought and possibly redefined.

Antitank Concept Projected

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 196,197

[Article: "Concept of the Fight Against Armored Offensive Forces in the 1990's"]

[Text] The pattern of war in the 1990's will be critically determined by technological progress, which primarily brings about a substantial increase in the effect of the fire of ground forces under all visibility conditions. Four important conclusions can be drawn from the development trends:

--The numerical inferiority of weapon systems can partially be compensated for through the increased effect of fire and barriers. Thus there are prospects of success against a superior massed offensive enemy.

--The possibility of being able to engage targets almost immediately in the depth as well expands the battlefield considerably. The attacker can be weakened while still approaching.

--Combat forces must have the necessary protection against up-to-date weapons technology so that they can move to or on the battlefield at any time. The capability for the mobile conduct of operations remains indispensable for the defender.

--The exploitation of the protective effect of builtup terrain becomes more important. This introduces a certain renaissance of the infantry.

A glance at the other side makes clear that our previous qualitative lead has largely been equalized. All findings indicate that besides additional structural improvements there is also a striving to overtake NATO technologically.

Conclusion: The main task of the army is the fight against a numerically superior, qualitatively equal, highly mobile armored attacker with substantial superiority of firepower. This requires:

--firepower primarily against armored targets,

--tactical and operational mobility for rapid and repeated massed concentration,

--capability for counterattacks to gain the initiative and to recapture lost territory,

--capability for the immediate engagement of enemy artillery at any time,

--capability for short-term and rapid interdicting of areas to reduce the possibilities for movement and to slow the pace of enemy forces,

--protection against conventional fire.

In addition,

--the capability for action is also indispensable in the use of nuclear and chemical weapons,

--the forward defense of the alliance as a whole requires close cooperation with the respective allied neighbors.

General Conditions

The army can proceed on the assumption that in the future as well the minimum peacetime personnel requirement will be covered and the defense level will be maintained in full. Even under changing overall conditions, however, it is necessary to maintain quality and quantity, eliminate remaining deficiencies, and orient the army toward a stronger conventional defense capability. In this connection, three points must be observed from the beginning:

--Despite the mentioned renaissance of the infantry, a "demechanization" of the army is out of the question; on the contrary: numerical inferiority requires the flexible utilization of mechanized forces in order to be strong enough at the crucial point at the right time.

Our own initiative can only be gained through the defeat of the enemy in operations; for this purpose, armored forces are and remain necessary.

--Operational thinking and operational command ingenuity, which in the past comprised the superiority of the German command, must regain their former status.

--The fight against the enemy in the depth of the area, now very much in the foreground, will not be at the expense of the fight against the first operational echelon. The engagement of enemy reserves is a wearing-down "replacement fight" that begins early in the depth.

Objective

The armored offensive forces of a potential aggressor have high firepower, protection and mobility; in addition, they have superior numbers and have the initiative at the beginning.

Merely to react against such an enemy just shifts the time of defeat. The objective of command ingenuity is to be stronger than the enemy "where and when necessary." For this, one needs freedom of action and this comes from initiative. But initiative is impossible without a minimum of freedom of action.

The objective, then, must be to ensure operational freedom of action. This occurs through armored combat forces who reinforced are available as reserves, because:

- a combination of command and reconnaissance systems facilitates "courage for the breach,"

- the fire and barrier effect of the operational elements is clearly increased and--temporally and locally limited--releases mechanized forces,

- light combat forces, employed in suitable terrain, help to avoid the unnecessary commitment of mechanized combat capability.

The armored combat forces thereby continue to be the core of the army in the defense. They are the ones who, fighting in all types of combat, are in a position

- to reduce the numerical superiority of an attacker from the beginning,

- to contain the enemy in his point of main effort as well,

- to seize control of the law of action.

These basic ideas are put into effect as follows:

Delaying actions achieve a greater attrition of the enemy armored offensive forces through the increased fire and barrier effect of artillery, engineers and antitank helicopters.

The defense is conducted in a mobile manner utilizing the protective effect of the buildup terrain with forces that receive massive support through barriers and fire. The battlefield is expanded in front through far-reaching fire. Attacking enemy forces are detected and worn down while still approaching. Enemy attempts to break through are foiled by the rapid shifting of points of main effort, the full utilization of the defense areas for a mobile conduct of operations, and a rapid concentration of fire.

Counterattacks are carried out quickly and forcefully with heavily armored reserves to destroy the enemy who has penetrated and to recapture lost territory. Armored forces must also be made available continually during combat to preserve the operational freedom of action.

Planning

A large number of support tasks must be fulfilled to ensure success on the battlefield: command, reconnaissance, combat support, logistics and medical services are a prerequisite in ensuring that the combat capability is effectively goal-oriented and that it remains effective as long as possible to destroy the armored offensive forces of the enemy before they have done substantial damage to our own forces.

The measures for carrying out the basic concepts cover all areas. The basis is still Army Structure 4, which is being further developed in an evolutionary manner.

Combat:

The defense of armored offensive forces occurs in the system "Armored Combat Forces 90." A close linking of mutually complementary weapon systems compensates for the weakness of one element through the strengths of another.

The weapon system battle tank brings together as no other the factors firepower, survivability and mobility in an optimum manner. The battle tank is therefore the core of the system. With the Leopard 2, the army has a sufficiently efficient weapon system but certainly not in satisfactory numbers.

Two weapon systems are foreseen instead of the existing armored personnel carrier: an infantry combat vehicle that transports armored infantrymen on the battlefield and that has a automatic gun for fire support.

An antitank combat vehicle ensures the antitank capability of the armored infantrymen in the defense.

A self-propelled mortar remains the high-angle fire element of armored combat forces.

The new and urgent task of helicopter defense will in the future be taken over by a combat vehicle that in the role of tank destroyer can also combat battle tanks at long range. The weapon system, whose development has priority, will have a platform that can be elevated and a rocket system that can engage both types of targets at long range (tank destroyer/helicopter defense combat vehicle).

Light combat forces complement the armored combat forces by taking over combat tasks in terrain favorable for infantry. Airborne forces equipped with the "Wiesel" weapons carrier will quickly bring an infantry combat capability and antitank weapons into focal points.

The Antitank Helicopter 2 will clearly increase the army's antitank capability further.

Combat Support

The development of ammunition makes it possible to engage armored targets effectively through indirectly aimed weapons systems as well. For this purpose, it is necessary to have target acquisition and fire control in almost real time.

The mixture of tube and rocket weapon systems remains important for conventional artillery. The Mars artillery rocket launcher with a range of up to 45 kilometers will not only be the precondition for artillery engagement but will also be able to take over that of the reserves and the following echelons. Self-propelled howitzers provide for the immediate and continuous fire support of their own combat forces. High ammunition stocks, including bomblet ammunition and ammunition with search fuzes, are necessary and provided for. Before the end of the 1990's, combat drones will make possible the early conventional effect against armored offensive forces in the depth.

The tasks of the engineers will shift even more clearly to combat with and around barriers. New minelaying and launching systems together with more effective antitank mines such as antitank directional mines that independently engage armored targets, for example, raise the effectiveness of barriers against armored offensive forces. The counteroffensive of our own forces is supported with innovative mineclearing equipment.

In the area of antiaircraft defense, with the weapon systems "Gepard" and "Roland," the army continues to be in a position to protect its own battlefield movements against the threat by enemy air forces. The extensive army air defense, reconnaissance and command system will also clearly improve the efficiency of the army air defense.

Command, Reconnaissance

The numerical inferiority of the defender and the possibilities of the attacker for surprise and massed concentration force the flexible employment of forces. Efficient reconnaissance forces with effective reconnaissance resources are a precondition for this. The drone system increases the reconnaissance capacity of corps and divisions through long ranges and real-time data transmission. Radar equipment for target acquisition and battlefield surveillance improve the reconnaissance capability of the brigades. Electronic reconnaissance increase their own freedom of action. In comparison with technical reconnaissance resources, armored and unarmored ground reconnaissance has proved its worth and will have a permanent place in the army of the 1990's.

New radio sets with automatic channel selection give the army the best equipment in the area of field radio. Favorable frequency utilization, high reliability and good protection against electronic warfare ensure the technical prerequisites for the required flexible utilization of forces.

The Heros command system reduces the time requirement for the command and control process and leads to an information system that makes possible the rapid access to needed reconnaissance results for all command echelons.

Operational Support:

Efficient logistics and a modernly equipped medical service are the bases for the successful fight of our own forces against the enemy's armored offensive forces.

The improved reconnaissance possibilities and the greater weapon effect even in the depth of our own territory as well as the support of uninterrupted operations require the mobility and flexibility of the logistical system. For this reason, independent companies or formations continue to require their own elements or units for supply, transport and maintenance able to carry out their mission even beyond surfaced roads. Repair must take place at the lowest possible level as near as possible to the place of the breakdown. The logistical independence of the battalions and brigades makes possible their operational mobility.

The field medical service must see to it that the wounded receive first aid as soon as possible; it receives "emergency physician" status. This as well as the rapid evacuation of the wounded with helicopters to medical facilities in the rear strengthens troop morale.

The concept of the fight against armored offensive forces is the "quintessence" of the army concept: armored enemy offensive forces are worn down through barriers and fire. In this way, our own armored combat forces are put into a position not only to ward off attacks but to destroy the forces of the attacker through counterattack.

Direct Antitank Fire

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 198-201

[Article: "Fight Against Armored Offensive Forces With Directly Aimed Fire"]

[Text] "The main task of the battle tank is the destruction of enemy tanks." With this assigned task and its main weapon, the main gun, the battle tank is the classical representative of directly aimed fire for antitank defense. Besides the battle tank, however, a number of other weapons and weapon systems are capable of destroying enemy tanks with directly aimed fire. The following explains the defense against armored offensive forces with these weapons and weapon systems and presents an outlook for the future.

In direct aiming, the gunner sees the target in his sight. "Visual contact" prevails between the direct-vision block of the sight and the enemy. That is the nature of direct aiming. It characterizes the antitank weapons and the weapon systems of the combat forces. This also indicates that the distance between the weapon and the target cannot be as great as one might desire, for with his eyes and possible with the help of the sight the gunner must detect, recognize and identify the enemy before he begins firing. Nature, however, puts definite limits on this procedure through human capabilities and physics, so that direct aiming with adequate prospects of success is possible only to about 4,000 meters.

Directly aimed weapons for antitank defense can be divided into two types, tube weapons and rockets. Both types function according to different principles and complement one another.

Tube weapons permit a high rate of fire, the firing of several types of ammunition, and fast reaction. They are not dependent upon a minimum distance to the target.

Rockets fly substantially more slowly than the projectiles of tube weapons. The rate of fire and the possibility for the rapid change of targets is therefore restricted. Their advantage is in the greater range and the possibility of transporting large effective masses. The shaped charge is thereby the preferred working principle of the rocket warheads for antitank defense. In its classical form, however, this principle is subjected to limits that will soon be reached.

The gun fires primarily kinetic energy rounds. The projectiles act through their kinetic energy (KE) and today are designed as subcaliber arrow projectiles. In addition, however, there is the possibility of firing high-explosive shells as well as chemical energy HEAT rounds from tube weapons for antitank defense.




Figure 1. Ranges in Antitank Defense

Key:

1. Battle tank BK 120 mm
2. Battle tank BK 105 mm
3. Missile-equipped tank destroyer HOT
4. Missile-equipped tank destroyer TOW
5. Antitank guided missile system MILAN
6. Panzerfaust
7. Armored personnel carrier BMK 20 mm
8. Lightly armored targets

Antitank Defense Today

The core of the antitank defense of the German Army today is the battle tank Leopard 2. With it the armored brigades have a weapon system that can engage all now-known battle tanks of a potential enemy. Its main features, the 120-mm smooth-bore gun, the thermal imager integrated into the electronic fire control system, its ballistic protection, and a maximum of mobility enable it to be used in all types of combat and under almost all weather and environmental conditions. Meanwhile, the 120-mm smooth-bore gun with its up-to-date technology and its growth potential has also been introduced into the U.S. Army for the M1 A1 Abrams battle tank. In the future, it will be the "measuring stick" by which tank guns will have to be measured.

But the armored infantry brigades of the field army also have the Leopard 1 battle tank. In addition, the territorial army is also equipped with the M 48 battle tank. Both vehicles are equipped with the well-proven 105-mm gun. Just as the 120-mm smooth-bore gun, the 105-mm gun likewise fires a KE and a chemical energy HEAT round. The third ammunition type HESH (High Explosive Squash Head) originally on hand is no longer being procured because of its slight effect on modern armor. The type ratio for the other two ammunition

types has also shifted in favor of the KE ammunition. Whereas previously the performance of the shaped-charge ammunition against conventional armor of homogeneous rolled steel was at least equal to the effect of the KE ammunition, today it can be stated that through the further development of the KE penetrators into arrow projectiles the penetration performance of the KE ammunition against modern multiple-plate targets has increased substantially. With this ammunition type, fired from the 105-mm gun, the Leopard 1 and M 48 battle tanks are also in a position to engage the T-72 battle tank effectively frontally in the turret and hull.

The 20-mm automatic gun of the Marder armored personnel carrier is not foreseen for the engagement of battle tanks but for the engagement of lightly armored and unarmored targets. Optionally it can also fire high-explosive shells and armor-piercing projectiles in a burst of fire or single fire. Thus it is possible for the Marder armored personnel carrier to destroy enemy armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance tanks without requiring the support of battle tanks.

Along with the battle tanks, the antitank guided missiles constitute the second element of the antitank weapons of the combat forces. The "Milan," a wire-guided missile of medium range (up to 2,000 meters) is the antitank weapon of the infantry. It can be employed either from the Marder armored personnel carrier or dropped from a tripod. The airborne force has mounted it on the KRAKA (motor cart), which can thus be airlifted and also dropped by parachute. With the "Milan," the infantry has a weapon that, mounted on a Marder armored personnel carrier or KRAKA, makes possible--on the one hand--rapid reaction in surprise situations or use in attack but that can also be used--on the other hand--in defense from prepared field fortifications. It is then effective from terrain favorable to the infantry into the tank terrain and is most effective in flanking movements. The night operations capability of this weapon is produced through its intended equipping with the passive MIRA thermal imager. Beginning in the mid-1990's, the PARS 3 will take over the tasks of the "Milan."

The antitank rocket systems TOW and HOT have ranges of 3,000 and 4,000 meters, respectively. They thus belong to the "long-range systems." The TOW, a U.S. development, represents the strong element of the paratroopers, since for airborne operations it, just as the "Milan," is mounted on the KRAKA and can be employed from this. The Jaguar 2 tank destroyer is also equipped with the TOW. The AN-TAS 4 thermal imager gives the TOW a night operations capability for the full range. The tank destroyer companies of the armored infantry brigades are equipped with the Jaguar 2 tank destroyer. Employed as a self-contained unit or in platoons with the battalions of the combat troops and dependent upon cooperation, the Jaguar 2 tank destroyer is a massed-fire weapon for antitank defense at the command echelon of the brigade. So is the Jaguar 1 tank destroyer, which is equipped with the HOT, a German-French development.

Through its range of 4,000 meters, the Jaguar 1 tank destroyer can open fire even before it is itself in the field of fire of the guns of the enemy battle tanks. The tank destroyer companies of the armored brigades, which have the

Jaguar 1 tank destroyer, thereby wear down the enemy even before the battle tanks can take up the firefight.

Beginning in 1989, the "Wiesel" weapons carrier with the TOW or with the 20-mm automatic gun will replace the KRAKA. With it, the airborne force will then have a vehicle with the performance in the areas of mobility, protection, firepower and air transportability that is important for the unrestricted fulfillment of the mission of the First Airborne Division.

Antitank hand weapons are the third element of antitank defense. The light Panzerfaust 44 is a typical representative of this type. It has been introduced not only into the combat forces but also into almost all army service branches as a means of antitank defense for ranges up to 300 meters. With a simple optical sight and a mechanical firing mechanism, it is robust and rugged. Because of its limited projectile weight, however, the effect of its shaped-charge warhead on up-to-date frontal armor is not always reliable. The gunner thereby seeks to attack the enemy battle tank from the side or from behind to be more effective.

Besides the combat troops, the artillery is also in a position to engage individual enemy armored vehicles. This occurs in direct aiming with the field howitzers or self-propelled howitzers. To be sure, this type of operations is not the rule but it is very possible to engage standing or approaching armored targets at ranges up to 1,000 meters with adequate hit prospects. A 155-mm high-explosive shell thereby has a substantial effect even when it does not pierce the armor of the target.

Antitank Defense Tomorrow

The constant increase in the threat through battle tanks and armored personnel carriers results from increased armor protection through special armor, more mobility because of more powerful motors and improved drives, greater firepower through improved ammunition and electronic fire control systems, and greater ranges through increasingly large calibers. Combat effectiveness upgrading is a possibility for meeting these threats and keeping introduced systems up to the threat.

At the present time, there are plans, beginning in 1986, to install a new EMES 18 fire control system with integrated thermal imager into 1,300 Leopard 1 A1 battle tanks. In this way, the first-round hit probability will be raised substantially and the complete night operations capability with passive night vision equipment ensured. The substantial design similarity of the EMES 18 and of the thermal imager with the fire control system of the Leopard 2 battle tank thereby brings additional logistical advantages and standardization in training. After the positive completion of the corresponding investigations, preliminary measures for a further upgrading of combat effectiveness can be included in this upgrading--measures that could include, for example, the installation of the 120-mm gun of the Leopard 2 battle tank, a new supplementary armor for the turret, and the installation of a fire suppression system.

The improvement of the ballistic protection is urgent for an upgrading of the combat effectiveness of the Marder armored personnel carrier. An increase in the caliber of the guns of armored personnel carriers will be the subject of additional considerations in the future, as the development potential of the 20-mm automatic gun for the engagement of armored targets is thought to be largely exhausted.

The delivery of the Leopard 2 battle tank began in 1979. The fifth lot has been in delivery since November 1985. In 1987, 1,800 Leopard 2 battle tanks will be delivered. With the planned service life into the decade after the next, an upgrading of the combat effectiveness of this weapon system will need to be planned for the mid-1990's.

The limiting conditions for an upgrading of the combat effectiveness of the introduced Leopard 2 battle tank are then to be presented in a Tactical Requirement through the evaluation of the previous experiences and investigations already under way. But the time period for the upgrading of combat effectiveness will mainly depend upon an accurate analysis of the threat, the expected technical possibilities and the appropriation of funds. Possible contents of this upgrading of combat effectiveness could include: improvement of the ballistic protection in the front, roof and rear areas; installation of sensors for helicopter and radar warning, for example; independent thermal imager for the commander; and installation of an integrated command and information system.

Besides the planning for the upgrading of the combat effectiveness of the weapon systems, work is also being done on the improvement of the performance of the 105-mm gun as well as of the 105-mm and 120-mm ammunition. The lengthening of the barrel of the 105-mm gun results in an increase in velocity. In this way, there is an increase in penetration performance at a given range or in the distance at which a penetration can be achieved dependably in a given time. The utility of such a measure, which would have the advantage that one could fall back on existing ammunition stocks for a certain time, is to be compared with the associated costs and to be evaluated, however, before a decision is made on the installation of a lengthened 105-mm gun or on the retrofitting with the 120-mm gun of the Leopard 2 battle tank. For this gun, there are intentions to develop a new type of ammunition for the engagement of unarmored and lightly armored targets as well as helicopters. The KE ammunition will also be substantially improved in its performance capability once again. It is a very good example of what growth potential can mean and of how weapon systems can be used in an optimum manner over a long time through the timely provision of the possibilities for upgrading combat effectiveness.

But the upgrading of combat effectiveness no longer makes sense when the threat cannot be countered adequately successfully by incorporating all measures. For the armored combat forces of the 1990's, then, the German Army has planned the development and procurement of new weapon systems for antitank defense as well. This "tactical family" includes:

--battle tank/armored combat vehicle

--armored personnel carrier/infantry combat vehicle

--tank destroyer/helicopter defense combat vehicle

--antitank combat vehicle

In the development of new weapon systems, the greatest possible standardization is to be sought. In addition, the consideration of the life cycle costs will have great influence on the selection of a concept and on the further development of each particular weapon system.

The first new development to be realized will be the antitank combat vehicle. As expressed by the designation itself, this is a vehicle that is optimized for the main task of antitank defense, just as a battle tank. Beginning in the mid-1990's, the antitank combat vehicle will take over the previous task of the "Milan" in the armored infantry battalions, for it has become apparent that the Marder weapon system is overburdened with the functions of the transport of the infantry troops, engagement of lightly armored and unarmored targets with the automatic gun, and engagement of tanks with the "Milan." For the engagement of tanks, therefore, the antitank combat vehicle will be integrated into the armored infantry battalions. It will be armed with the 120-mm gun of the Leopard 2 battle tank. In the conceptual phase that ends in 1987, it will be necessary to decide whether the concepts casemate tank, crown mount or turret tank will be put into practice. It is considered certain, on account of the short conceptual phase and the planned early date of deployment, that proven component assemblies will be used in part.

The conceptual phase has started for the tank destroyer/helicopter. This weapon system will replace the Jaguar 1 and Jaguar 2 tank destroyers in the field army. The armament will be the "PARS antitank rocket system, third generation and long range." This is a "fire and forget" system and is being developed jointly with France and Great Britain. It will have a night operations capability and will be integrated into the tank destroyer/helicopter defense combat vehicle on a platform extendable to about 13 meters. This highly extendable platform makes it possible to find substantially more positions for the weapon system in broken terrain to utilize the maximum range of the rockets and simultaneously to have cover against enemy vision and weapons effect. As an additional task, this weapon system will take over the helicopter defense for the combat forces. At the end of the conceptual phase, a decision must be made on whether the weapons and observation platform will be manned or unmanned and which sensors must then be mounted on the platform.

The infantry combat vehicle is to replace the Marder armored personnel carrier in the field army. It takes over its task except for antitank defense, however, which is taken over by the antitank combat vehicle. An important question that will have to be resolved within the scope of the current conceptual phase is the caliber size of its future weapon. In this connection, a decision must be made on its target spectrum within the scope of the combat of combined arms. When it is confronted with the task of engaging

the BMP-2 armored personnel carrier, for example, a 25-mm or 35-mm automatic gun will no longer be adequate. For this purpose, guns of up to 60 mm should be considered.

The present Leopard 3 battle tank program will end in 1986 with a final report. The program results will lead in a cost effective manner to the measures to upgrade the combat effectiveness of the Leopard 2 battle tank and to the preparation of the technical requirement for the Armored Combat Vehicle 2000. The Armored Combat Vehicle 2000 is to replace the Leopard 1 battle tank.

In the scope of the preparation of the technical requirement for a weapon system to replace the Leopard 1 battle tank, it will also be investigated whether a conventionally built and evolutionarily developed battle tank still represents the most favorable possibility for the fulfillment of the task in view of the changed quality of the threat through intelligent ammunition, responsive sensors and the substantial automation of operating sequences on the battlefield.

Modern technologies such as, for example, adaptable active armor (reactive armor), digitalization of all electronic functions/data bus, up-to-date camouflage procedures, and sensors to recognize threats are to be incorporated. For armament, the 120-mm smooth-bore gun would basically be available but its performance needs to be improved. There is certainly potential for improving performance here. If the threat analysis were to reveal, however, that even a 120-mm smooth-bore gun with improved performance is no longer adequate, then new technologies must be applied.

But there are plans not merely for the new development of complex weapon systems. The PARS antitank rocket system, third generation, medium range, is in the definition phase. This system will in part replace the "Milan." The FRG, France and Great Britain are participating in the project. The system has a range of 2,000 meters and, just as the "Milan," can be carried by two soldiers or adapted to light combat vehicles, for example. Guidance is through a LASER guide beam (beamrider). The double shaped charge of the warhead can penetrate even up-to-date armor reliably and with adequate residual power. The first systems will be delivered to the field forces in 1993.

The light Panzerfaust 44 will also find a replacement in the Panzerfaust 3. After its introduction beginning in 1988, this weapon will be distributed in the Bundeswehr just as the antitank hand weapons previously introduced or still being introduced and will serve in the further concentration of antitank defense in all three military services. The weapon is designed as a so-called bipartite solution and is composed of

--a reusable weapon part and

--an ammunition part as a bulk expendable item.

It will make possible accurate firing at 300 meters from emplacements and closed areas. The simple training of the gunner and a growth potential for

improved performance of the warhead will allow it to be a weapon equal to the threat in the 1990's so as to destroy all targets provided with up-to-date armor. At the same time, with the reusable weapon part and an ammunition part as a bulk expendable item, it is a very economical solution.

Effects of New Technologies on Tactics

New Technologies have always had some effect on tactics. It will be no different in the future. And although under the current state of knowledge there will not be any revolutionary changes, a change or a further development of tactics can be predicted for subareas.

The increased first round hit probability in almost all weapons and weapon systems brings about an increase in operating ranges. To utilize the full performance offered, therefore, it will be a matter even more than before of considering the range advantages of their own weapon systems in operational plans and in tactical grouping and of including them in terrain evaluation.

With the Leopard 2 battle tank, the degree of mobility was achieved that can be utilized on the battlefield. A further increase will no longer be sought when all of the army combat vehicles have reached this level. But the application of new technologies has produced substantial progress in the area of ballistic protection, so that it has again taken second place behind firepower in the sequence of priorities. Weapon systems with a maximum of ballistic protection will show a substantially greater staying power than in the case of those in which mobility, that is, the capability of a rapid change of position, was part of the protective concept. In the selection of the emplacement, then, it will be even more necessary than before to pay attention to the possible effect of our own weapons. The substantial automation of technical sequences (automatic loader, integrated fire control, automatic target allocation, etc.) accelerates the flow of combat. Combined with high hit probabilities and high kill probabilities, the decision on the outcome of a battle must be expected more and more rapidly. But that also determines more rapid operating sequences in the command process, especially at the lower command echelons. They can be achieved here as well only through automation. The tactical commanders would thereby be freed from time-consuming routine operations and could devote themselves more intensively to their command function.

The capability for combat at night and with limited visibility is being increased more and more. Weapon systems are designed for the conducting of "uninterrupted operations." That is an enormous burden for people and material. As long as it is not possible to work in multiple shifts (with alternating crews, for example), the military commander must include this in operational planning and in tactical grouping. Under this point of view, reserves and relief attain new importance.

Indirect Antitank Fire

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 202-206

[Article: "Action Against Armored Offensive Forces With Indirectly Aimed Fire"]

[Text] The artillery, the main supporter of the firefight, will gain even more importance in repulsing armored offensive forces in the future. It is not thereby supposed to take over the primary task of the battle tank but to engage hardened targets in the depth of the area in the combat of combined weapons. This has not heretofore been possible, since important preconditions for this were lacking. In a self-defense situation, to be sure, a gun could always knock out battle tanks in direct aiming at close range, that is "eye to eye" with the force of the large calibers but this was the exception.

Indirect aiming means that targets are not to be reached through a sighting device but with calculated commands and generally invisible for the crew at a great distance from the fire. But this assumes that targets are detected, located and radioed to the fire direction center of the batteries. This is how the classical information complex is portrayed. But without suitable ammunition, with which even armored moving targets can be engaged effectively, this mission was not heretofore achievable through the artillery.

The Artillery Complex

Besides the improved performance of artillery weapons through

- greater ranges,
- increase in the rate of fire,
- improvement of accuracy,
- introduction of ammunition types appropriate to the threat and
- increase in the transport capacity of subammunition,

the ammunition will in the future have an effective system linkage between reconnaissance/target acquisition means and weapon systems.

Real-time reconnaissance, jamming-resistant data links, and computer-assisted fire control then make it possible to engage armored targets in indirect aiming. The increase in the driving speed of the targets through improvement of the power-to-weight ratio of the armored combat vehicles of the Warsaw Pact armed forces as well as the increasing hardening through the application of up-to-date armor techniques are compensated through suitable countermeasures and considered in our long-range performance profile. This is indicated in the following:

The requirement for the introduction or development of long-range reconnaissance/target-acquisition means are considered with the systems "Drone CL 289" and "remotely piloted vehicle for target acquisition."

The computer-assisted data transmission is to be carried out under the system concept ArtFuelnFELSys (Artillery-Command-Information-Fire Control System) with the introduction of

- the Artillery-Data-Situation-Operation Computer-Complex (ADLER),
- the Integrated Fire Control Means Artillery Battery (IFAB) and
- the Artillery-Rocket-Operations-System (ARES).

In other words, the artillery has begun, through the realization of the combination of weapon systems and long-range sensors, to create an integrated artillery system that will be up to any threat in the foreseeable future.

Tube Artillery

The question of whether field artillery guns are still up-to-date in a conceivable theater of war has been under discussion for a long time. The obvious advantages of the field howitzer, such as

- low price,
- low technical complexity,
- high reliability and
- small silhouette and the associated slight vulnerability of the equipment are opposed by equally obvious disadvantages, such as
- low mobility (despite self-propulsion),
- no protection for the crew (ballistic and NBC protection) and
- high personnel and material expenditures for each gun.

The increasing threat above all from the enemy artillery and the continuously growing demands on its own artillery with respect to protection, effect on the target, mobility, rate of fire and autonomy have had the effect that in the final equipment planning for the artillery of the field army only armored artillery guns (self-propelled howitzers)--besides the rocket launchers--are now to be found. The field howitzers will find their end use in the artillery formations of the territorial army for some time to come.

The 155-mm Field Howitzer 155-1, also known under the designation Field Howitzer 70, was developed jointly by the three NATO countries Great Britain, Italy and the FRG and has been in use in the armies of these countries for

several years. The gun made such a good name for itself after only a short time that several nations of the Western world have procured it or are interested in it. Its range of fire is up to 24 kilometers, 30 kilometers with a booster.

The older 155-mm self-propelled howitzer M109G is now being retrofitted to the current U.S. A3 status and simultaneously thoroughly overhauled and upgraded in its combat effectiveness. With the resulting 155-mm self-propelled M109A3G, the artillery has a proven system in large numbers that will be main armament of the armored artillery until the 1990's when replaced by a more up-to-date self-propelled howitzer. Norway has joined this reequipment.

Just as in the case of the 155-mm field howitzer, the nations Great Britain, Italy and Germany have teamed up to develop an up-to-date 155-mm self-propelled howitzer--the Self-Propelled Howitzer 155-1. It is to replace the self-propelled howitzers in the armies of these three states as soon as possible. Only with the introduction of a more up-to-date self-propelled howitzer will the equipment of the armored artillery also correspond to the otherwise already modern inventory status of the artillery.

In the 203-mm caliber, the old guns 175-mm M107 SF and 203-mm M110A1 SF howitzers were converted into 203-mm M110A2 SF howitzers in the course of the caliber adjustment and upgrading of combat effectiveness. (Footnote) (See SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, No 6/85, p 350). In addition to the increase in the firing range to 23 kilometers thus accomplished for the 203-mm howitzer, these guns were also modernized and their "lifetime" lengthened. It will have to be decided in the foreseeable future whether the Bundeswehr artillery will also retain this caliber beyond the 1990's.

Ammunition of the Tube Artillery

In the case of the ammunition types foreseen for the artillery for repulsing armored offensive forces, one distinguishes between the ammunition for the engagement of primarily semihard targets such as armored personnel carriers and self-propelled howitzers, for example, and the ammunition for the engagement of hard targets, the tanks. Thus, for the engagement of semihard targets, the tube artillery also uses so-called bomblets that are placed in the 155-mm and 203-mm projectiles in different numbers depending upon the caliber. The effect of the shaped-charge bomblets is directed against the surface of the armored vehicles that is known to be less heavily armored. The hit probability is based upon the relatively high unit quantity and the cost-effectiveness on the low price of the bomblets as a mass product. All bomblets utilized or foreseen have a substantial fragmentation effect against personnel and unprotected material and a considerable effect against hard targets.

The so-called search-fuze ammunition for the tube artillery is an advanced stage of development. The principle of this ammunition is based upon the use of projectile-forming charges (P-charges) in combination with sensors on an infrared and millimetric wave basis. If the sensors find an armored target, then they initiate a P-charge in the subammunition falling on a (rotating)

parachute. The projectile then hitting the target with very great kinetic energy is able to penetrate all previously introduced roof armor. Great progress was made in recent years in the development and optimization of the P-charges.

Rocket Artillery

With the light artillery rocket system LARS, the Bundeswehr was the first NATO army to introduce an artillery weapon against area targets. In a very short time, even before the enemy achieves a certain "hardening" through the finding of cover, large quantities of ammunition are brought into the target. The range is 16 kilometers.

With the use of FERA (fire control equipment with trajectory measurement), it was possible to achieve an optimization of accuracy that permits the engagement of almost twice as many targets as before with the same expenditure of ammunition. The use of electronic fuzes not only increases the effect of the ammunition on the target but also shortens the preparation for firing and also increases the flexibility of operations.

With the introduction of the antitank mortar mines 1 and 2 (AT 1/AT 2), the artillery was given an antitank capability in indirect aiming for the first time. Mine fields can now be remotely delivered oriented to the target in a very short time. The AT 1 mine works against the track and the AT 2 over the entire length of the vehicle. A block against removal, resistance against the effects of explosions, and high penetration performance as well as programming of the effective time make the AT 2 the most up-to-date antitank mine for the coming years. In combination with the "intelligent ammunition," it can also be employed in the depth of enemy territory to prevent an early withdrawal of the enemy from the planned target area. This means the autonomous action against tanks as a new task of the artillery.

The most important step toward increasing conventional firepower was taken with the introduction of the Mean Artillery Rocket System (MARS). This weapon system developed in the United States is being procured and reproduced in Europe by other NATO partners. Complete autonomy and the possibility for deployment under NBC conditions with a crew of only three indicate the tremendous technological leap of the artillery. In addition, the system has the potential of also being adapted to future threats through the development of rockets different both in caliber as well as in range without changing the weapon system. The ammunition spectrum was oriented toward the hardened target scenario and, in addition to the bomblet ammunition and AT 2, will also include rockets with homing terminally-guided subammunition. For the first time, this "intelligent ammunition" will be able to distinguish "genuine" targets from so-called "false targets," that is, militarily unimportant targets. It is optimized for the identification of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled howitzers and is designed so as to take into consideration the increased driving speed of the targets as well as their increasing hardening.

The concept is characterized by a propulsionless missile that, along with several similar subbodies, is brought over the target area and discharged by the booster rocket. In the search phase, the search head "inspects" the target terrain. If an armored vehicle is detected, then the missile guides itself to the target. A built-in logic is supposed to exclude the engagement of a target element by several missiles. The impact angle will generally be between 45 and 90 degrees so that the lethal mechanism can find the shortest possible way through the armor. In approaching the target, this missile must be able to follow a rapidly-departing tank. This requires a great maneuverability in a limited area. The resulting effective area projected to the ground is designated as the "footprint." It must be achieved by each missile of a rocket; overlapping is thereby possible and necessary for small target groups. The "footprint" must have a minimum spread laterally and lengthwise to compensate for the following negative values:

--reconnaissance errors,

--rocket dispersion,

--target behavior in relation to the age of the target data and the flight time of the rocket.

The overall concept of the artillery in the engagement of so-called semihard and hard targets, that of wearing down the enemy forces early during the approach through long-range fire and limiting their freedom of operation, is now to be carried out with the rocket artillery.

In the next phases of the approach of the enemy until intervening in the combat, the rocket artillery gradually also "turns over" the task of engaging tanks to the tube artillery, which then acts in observed fire.

Evaluation

In conclusion, it can be stated:

--With the indirectly aimed weapons of the artillery, armored targets are engaged from above--that is, against the heretofore slightly armored surface--through "modern" and "intelligent" ammunition.

--The even weaker underside is engaged with antitank mortar mines.

--And the front and side surfaces are primarily engaged through the combat forces with their directly-aimed antitank weapons.

Because different sensors are utilized, a potential enemy will be able to protect his armored combat forces only with a large financial expenditure and a loss of mobility.

The night operations capability, rapid reaction times, and large area effect will require the use of new tactics by the enemy and will make more difficult the massing of armored forces for concentrations prior to the start of an offensive.

Nevertheless, the main task of the artillery must be seen in the engagement of the artillery of the enemy and must be in balance with the defense against armored offensive forces, for it must be assumed that in its offensive preparations the enemy artillery will seek to neutralize our own antitank systems. This must be prevented so as not to endanger the success of a conventional defense.

Antitank Mine Warfare Development

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 208,209

[Article: "Barriers With Mines--A Dynamic Operation"]

[Text] In the state of defense, the threat by the fully mechanized armored forces of the Warsaw Pact through the entire width of the territory of the FRG requires all-round barrier operations by the army within the scope of forward defense. Barriers are to check or at least complicate and slow down enemy movements. They are also set up with the intention of steering enemy forces into areas in which they can be destroyed through concentrated fire or through counterattacks. In this way, barriers make a major contribution to restricting the freedom of action of the attacker. Barriers give support to their own forces and help to hold terrain, gain time, and save forces.

Mines

The mine, especially the antitank mine, is the classical combat means of the defender; there is no doubt about its defensive nature. With mines, diverse barriers can be set up and they can be laid in almost any terrain. In addition, the obstacle value of other barriers can often be increased through mines. Beyond that, the destructive effect of mines cause losses to the attacker.

The Anglo-Saxons call the mine "the poor man's weapon" because in it the relationship between expenditure and effect is especially cost-effective. This statement is confirmed by an OR study that comes to the overall conclusion that the mine is in first place in a listing of the weapons based upon cost and effectiveness data. One should not fail to mention thereby that the mines available in the army can restrict and often even impede the mobile conduct of operations.

Mine Warfare As a Static Action

The conventional mines can be layed only by hand, that is, they require much time and manpower. Their pressure-operated fuze works only against the track and this is why there is a requirement for a relatively dense laying. Once

laid, it is time-consuming to take them up again. All this means that the static element of the conventional mine sets clear limits to the introduction of mine warfare into the mobile conduct of operations: prepared mine barriers in preplanned barrier plans can hardly be adapted to unexpected developments. A lack of time keeps mines from being laid.

For this reason, years ago the army engineers called for new mines with a large triggering width, that is, effective against track and hull with adjustable effective times and mechanical delivery systems for rapid laying.

Beginning in 1986, many of these demands will be fulfilled with the delivery of various systems; their influence on the conduct of operations will confirm the great importance of the mine, especially the antitank mine, for the defender.

The Minelaying System

To begin with, we should mention the minelaying system (MiVS 85), which serves the more terrain-oriented and generally prepared use of barriers for the state of defense. It is composed of the minelaying trailer with plow, the 7-ton military truck as a means of towing and mine transport, and the antitank laid mine. This mine works against the track and hull, that is, against the entire width of the vehicle. It has a magneto and is secured against lifting; after a few weeks, the mine can neutralize itself and is then reusable. The minelaying trailer mechanically activates and lays 300 mines per hour covered or about 600 mines per hour exposed. A varying mine density is adjustable. The towing vehicle can carry more than 700 antitank mines on pallettes.

The network of mine barriers laid with the MiVS 85 in accordance with the barrier plan can then be made denser by the commander at short notice in the course of combat--situation-oriented through the immediate engineer support with the mine launching system.

The Mine Launching System (MiWS)

This is composed of the mine launching vehicle "Skorpion" (M 548 G from the M 113 family) with the mine launching installation and the AT 2 antitank mortar mine. With a combat load of 600 mines, it is possible to lay a 1,500-meter mine barrier of the density 0.4 in 10 minutes.

The antitank mortar mine AT 2 has already been produced in large numbers for the Light Artillery Rocket System (LARS) for the ballistic laying of mine barriers. The same mine can also be laid exposed with the "Skorpion" in different mine densities and with different operative times. Secured against lifting, it acts as the antitank laid mine against the entire width of the vehicle and destroys itself after the end of the operative time.

The antitank mine systems that thus complement one another have just one gap: mortar and laid mines can be used or are effective only within limits on hardened streets and roads. The clearing is less difficult here because they

are easily recognizable. For this reason, the Antitank Directional Mine 1 will soon be introduced into the field forces.

The Antitank Directional Mine 1

It acts horizontally with a shaped charge against the hull and turret, has a range of up to 40 meters, and neutralizes itself automatically in the event that it is not triggered; afterwards it is reusable. With the antitank directional mine, it is possible to block gap lanes and other lanes between mine barriers as well as departure and access routes of all types quickly and effectively.

Conclusions

What conclusions result, then, from the introduction of these rapid barrier systems for the command and operational principles as well as for army logistics? It was possible to show in a number of map maneuvers of the engineer school and army technical school for structural engineering that with the rapid and mechanical deployment capability, adjustable varying operative time, and reusability of modern mines, mine warfare is receiving a dynamic element to which the combat forces as well as the engineers supporting them must adapt for the first time. This dynamics represents a challenge and requires that the commander coordinate the planned movements and the fire of his own forces with the planned barrier operations substantially more precisely than heretofore. The engineer commander, in turn, must be in command of a barrier plan with constantly changing operative times for individual barriers; the rapid flow of events requires no less rapid and certain communications and even closer cooperation in the fire support center, among other places.

Mine Warfare As a Dynamic Action

It is becoming apparent that "the element barrier capability is joining the classical tactical elements fire and movement" and that "we are coming to a triad of the factors "fire," "barriers" and "movement." In the logistics area, it is necessary, in addition to the storage and maintenance of electronic sensors and fuzes, to assemble larger quantities of mines more quickly. This means, in turn, that new time concepts will be in effect beginning with the handling in ammunition depots with mechanical stackers to the loading of transport vehicles using the corresponding loading aids to the delivery to the deploying engineers.

All of this is due to a rethinking in the combat and combat support forces: the mine may no longer be seen as the primarily static explosive ordnance that--once laid and activated--also hinders the movements of our own forces. On the contrary, the up-to-date "intelligent" mine is more than ever the

explosive ordnance of the defender, who makes use of its newly acquired dynamics and employs this in the combat of the combined weapons in such a way that his own movements are not hindered but are even supported "in the triad fire, barriers and movement."

Antitank Helicopter Doctrine

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 210-212

[Article: "The Antitank Helicopter in the Fight Against Armored Offensive Forces"]

[Text] A numerical equilibrium with the Warsaw Pact forces in armored weapon systems can be ruled out for the future as well. The quality of the weapon systems of the East and West is becoming more and more nearly equal. As early as the beginning of the 1970's, the analysis of the threat and its probable trend for the German Army showed that existing gaps in antitank defense can reasonably be closed only through a flexible weapon system with the capability of a rapid massed concentration and the strengthening of the antitank defense of the combat forces.

For the conduct of operations in the defense of fighting formations, it is a matter of bringing together sufficient antitank forces relative to the points of main effort of the attacker in the shortest time possible. For armed forces that have to defend broad combat zones with a limited number of troops, antitank helicopters are an effective and often the only means of clearing up a critical situation, a means that when organized practically is always quickly available for the commanders of all major and combat formations so as to be able to check the enemy swiftly and unexpectedly at the decisive point.

The helicopter is thus a system that is equal to the requirement that our own reserves be available for massed concentration more quickly and with greater mobility. Above all antitank helicopters are in a position to be quickly available by day and, in the future, by night as well to

--begin combat unexpectedly at great distance,

--be employed in rapid succession at changing focal points of the combat,

--strengthen or form new points of main effort.

In independent action, they are also suitable above all for the containment and engagement of the enemy armored forces that have already been successful in penetrating the defense area or even in breaking through into the depth.

Such fundamental considerations were the basis for the introduction of antitank helicopters of the first generation into the German Army. The antitank helicopter BO 105 P does not have a capability for night operations. With its small silhouette and great agility as a flying weapons platform, it

corresponds to the conclusions of the threat analysis of that time. With its limited loading potential and lack of self-protection armament, on the other hand, it represents only an interim solution until an antitank helicopter with a night operations capability is introduced.

Principles for the Utilization of Antitank Helicopters

Planning

Through their early employment in the retardation phase, antitank helicopters are to cause the numerically superior mechanized combat forces of the enemy severe losses of tanks and thereby make the balance of forces more favorable at the beginning of the defense. It is thereby important that the antitank helicopters not be employed too early, that is, not "instead of" combat forces, but that they be used with them in the "combat fo combined arms." In this way:

- a high enemy attrition is achieved and

- their own combat forces are kept from rapid attrition through close engagement.

Antitank helicopters are most effective in interaction with combat forces. They are not suitable for replacing combat forces, for they

- cannot hold terrain,

- are suitable only for combat against armored vehicles,

- cannot act at close range.

Regulating the Cooperation

The corps assigns antitank helicopters to the divisions for a certain period of time or for an operation. As a rule, this occurs during the evening position of the corps, when the expected points of main effort of the enemy attack for the next day become clear. In the short term, that is, within 60 minutes prior to readiness for action, however, antitank helicopters can also be used to clear up crisis situations.

Combat Tactics

Antitank helicopters can be employed for encounters and simultaneously. The particular type of employment results from the requirements of the troop commander. The rapid change of the type of employment is possible and will often be expedient. The combat tactics of the antitank helicopter remains unchanged in all types of combat, independent of the type, structure and equipment of the large formation being supported.

In the delaying action, the antitank helicopters strengthen the antitank defense of the covering force, largely in encounters during the temporally limited defense, so as to wear down the enemy continuously.

In the defense, antitank helicopters strengthen the antitank defense of the combat forces and are especially suitable for the rapid formation or shifting of the main antitank effort.

In the offensive, antitank helicopters monitor the flanks of the offensive forces and engage enemy counterattacks.

A special feature is the temporally limited independent operation: if close integration in the combat of the combined weapons is not possible--in breakthrough situations, for example--then the antitank helicopters must independently lead the combat for a limited time. For this purpose, it is necessary for the antitank helicopter commander to lead and coordinate the remaining operational combat, reconnaissance and barrier forces as well as fire support. These forces are to be attached to him until the cohesion of the conduct of operations is restored or until ground combat forces carry on the defensive battle from their positions.

Command Organization

The army aviation regiment keeps the antitank helicopters in readiness in the regimental assembly area. The antitank helicopter squadrons/flights are kept in readiness there at helicopter readiness sites until they are instructed to work with a major formation. They are then transferred to the advanced assembly areas in the combat sector of the relevant division. Advanced assembly areas include an advanced command post, readiness sites, and logistical installations.

Command Resources

For combat, antitank helicopters are dependent upon radio links, especially to the battalions of the combat forces. Communications records, command lines as well as reference points and coordinates of the command posts are continually kept available through the antitank helicopter regiment. In the case of the establishment of oral-personal communication or arrangements, the liaison detachments to the divisions as well as each commander of the antitank helicopters will coordinate the communications records for the formation.

Cooperation With Tank Destroyers and Combat Support Forces

Tank destroyers: tank destroyers and antitank helicopters are equipped with long-range guided missile systems and thus have both the advantage of superior range and, in utilizing their great effective ranges, the disadvantage of the obstruction to vision through smoke, dust and fog.

A simultaneous firefight from the same direction is inexpedient, for a continuously coordinated fire control is not possible.

Artillery/Mortars: In all agreements, the commanders of the antitank helicopters are to be informed about planned artillery concentration areas and planned and already occupied gun emplacements. Accordingly, that is valid for the use of mortars.

Army Air Defense: The system of the "organization of air space" represents a possibility for coordinating the use of antitank helicopters with the fire of air defense, artillery and air force. The planning for this is at the level of the ATAF; the commanding generals or the division commander have responsibility for monitoring and coordinating the sections acting in their areas. In this connection, the will of the troop commander must be expressed

clearly, for the operational requirements of the weapon systems mean limitations in either fire control or the use of antitank helicopters.

Further Development of Antitank Defense From the Air

Uninterrupted Operation

It must be assumed that the armed forces of the potential enemy are capable of uninterrupted operations by day or by night. The factors that heretofore have limited the combat of the PAH-1 are answered through basic demands on the PAH-2. For example:

- longer period of operation,
- at least eight guided missiles,
- full night operations capability and
- defensive armament against attack helicopters.

"Antitank Helicopter" Concept

The PAH-2's will also operate exclusively over their own area or territory not occupied by the enemy and make extensive use of the weapon effect and reconnaissance results of ground forces for their own firefight. It follows that the antitank helicopters, as opposed to the attack helicopters,

- have a high survival probability,
- achieve a better effect through close liaison with the combat forces in battle,
- can be more rationally developed and maintained through specialization in antitank defense in size and weight.

Structure/Organization

The PAH-2's, just as the transport forces at the corps level, are concentrated as an army formation, for only in this way can they form operational focal points. Advanced assembly areas in the division area are not needed. The exclusive disposition of the assembly areas in the rear corps area offers the advantage of increased survivability on the ground and improvement of the structure and ground organization.

Ground System

The concentration of the PAH-2's at the corps level and the resulting operational mobility in antitank defense will effect the structure and number of PAH-2's in the flight and thus the existing command organization.

In the case of the disposition of the antitank helicopter formation in the rear corps area, the question is raised of the availability of current situation data for the flight crews. This problem can be solved through the integration of the formation into the "HEROS" army command system.

In addition, the command and control process for the use of antitank helicopters, especially at night, requires the early results of an "air-supported" combat reconnaissance.

This refines the picture of the situation, in combination with the simultaneously acquired intelligence of terrain reconnaissance saves unnecessary losses, and shortens the time to the beginning of the firefight substantially.

It seems doubtful whether the flight leader tied to command tasks has the proper equipment with the costly PAH-2 weapon system. Therefore, besides the preconditions for secured long-range information transmission and situation display in the cockpit, a "command and escort helicopter" with a night flight capability is among the necessary command resources for the employment of the PAH-2's.

Defense Against Enemy Attack Helicopters

In the 1990's, the threat by Warsaw Pact attack helicopters will reach a level that can limit the use of the antitank helicopters. This threat will be met by arming the PAH-2 with air-to-air missiles.

In combination with the weapon systems of the army air defense forces as well as the automatic guns of the combat forces, "fire-and-forget" missiles afford the necessary "stand-off" distance to the tube weapons of enemy attack helicopters.

Airmobile Logistics

Operational mobility requires a logistics that can adapt to the requirements of large-area movements. Only airmobile supply can follow the operations of the antitank helicopters. It is provided through the helicopters of the army aviation group and is suitable for maintaining the reaction capability of the antitank helicopters through the rapid delivery of fuel and ammunition and through the removal of interference.

Layout of the PAH-2

In the future as well, it cannot be expected that one can equip a "small" antitank helicopter having a low takeoff weight and a small silhouette and preferred by most of the armies of the Western alliance with effective systems for night combat. Any compromise in this respect is at the expense of the efficiency of the weapons platform and has decisive disadvantages for the viability of the weapon system.

The Helicopter

The configuration of modern helicopters is determined by the expected characteristics and the tasks intended for them. Among other things, the sensor packet to be installed in the nose for night flight and operations led to a tandem cockpit in the form of steps with task-optimized work areas and improved visibility for the crew. A hingeless four-blade main rotor with a head made of fiber composite is, in addition to a long working life, also to provide for lower maintenance costs and tolerance against enemy fire. The basic prerequisite of the weapons platform is high stability, especially in hovering. This is realized through an up-to-date flight control system and the FEL (fiber-elastomer-bearing)-rotor system.

Detectability

As a "standoff fighter," the PAH-2 is designed with a weapons range over 4,000 meters. The resulting more difficult visual detectability is further reduced through additional measures. The reduction of the sound development of the rotors, as the greatest noise producers, is taken into account through low top blade speed and optimized blade profiles.

Vulnerability/Survivability

The reduction or increase, respectively, in the two criteria can be realized through armor, redundancy or concept selection. Armor and redundant system design add weight; redundancy also finds its limits in the cost-benefit compromise.

The concept selection for each element is aimed at the required period of survival as a result of damage. Thus rotor blades have become largely insensitive to enemy fire through the application of fiber composite materials and the sandwich type of construction of the airframe offers a favorable solution against hits with an explosive effect.

Against the effect of NBC weapons, it was decided to protect the crews individually through a pressurized ventilated protective suit.

ECM Concept

The specifications require basic equipment composed of:

- radar warning device,
- Laser warning device,
- IFF (Identification Friend/Foe),
- volume for growth potential

To make effective use of our own weapons under the threat of the 1990's as well, a reasonable mixture of passive warning devices with active jammers is to be preferred.

Mission Equipment

For the gunner, the Visionik installed in the nose is composed of:

- direct-vision optics,
- television camera,
- thermal imager with automatic missile and target tracking device,
- Laser-E meter.

The pilot has a thermal-image channel with a large field of view. Both thermal-image channels and the television sensor are controlled through a helmet sight and display system.

The antitank armament of the PAH-2 consists of eight antitank guided missiles. The HOT guided missile already available in the army will be used until the introduction of a true third-generation guided missile (fire and forget). A mix of both types of guided missiles in accordance with the value of the target can be advantageous. Guided missiles of the third generation have longer ranges, shorter exposure time, an autonomous homing head, and the possibility of engaging multiple targets.

The armament for self-protection is composed of four air-to-air guided missiles of the "STINGER" type with an infrared homing head and thus it has fire-and-forget qualities. Because of the time requirement for locking the search head on the target, however, it is not the ideal armament for duel situations at close ranges. The operational concept must take this situation into account.

Maintainability/Reliability

Reliability is also expressed in mission success. Demands of less than 95 percent for the probability of mission success are unacceptable. The design philosophy is that of defining so-called "breakdown operating modes" with the user, which permits a reduced serviceability under exceptional conditions but in any case ensures the certain return of the system. The most important demands on maintainability are:

- no time spare parts, durable structures,
- modular design of the subsystems,
- overhauling on condition and
- good accessibility of all modules.

With an up-to-date long-range guided missile in accordance with the fire-and-forget principle, the PAH-2 becomes a weapons platform optimized for antitank defense. An essential feature is the full night operations capability.

Within the scope of the limited takeoff weight determined by the combat range, survivability and staying power are ensured through ECM measures and partial armor. The thoughts on the operational principles are initial conclusions from the threat situation in the 1990's and from the "second generation antitank helicopter" concept. They will be refined in the course of the development of the weapon system.

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CSO: 3620/684

MILITARY

NORWAY

UNIFORM FOR PREGNANT ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL APPROVED

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 6 May 86 p 56

[Article by Paal-Andre Schwital]

[Text] Of course, the Armed Forces have to have a uniform for pregnant personnel. The maternity uniform will therefore now appear.

The production can start this year, if everything goes as scheduled. The maternity uniform will consist of a coat with shirt and pants. The coat and the pants will be made of the same material as the service uniform. And the pants will become 'flexible' with a ribbed section in the front.

The female inspector of the Navy, Navy Commander Elisabeth Westeng, says that the uniform is important because women may be detailed for duty somewhere else because they do not have suitable uniforms during their pregnancy. Many are not able to perform operative duty or watch duty either. They thus lose money. "Pregnant personnel are today able to use civilian clothes, but that solution is not satisfactory," says Peter A. Moe of the Norwegian Union of Officers and Noncommissioned Officers. Pregnant officers are not able to participate in maneuvers or perform watch duty. They lose service as qualified officers and thus money.

7262
CSO: 3639/116

MILITARY

NORWAY

BRIEFS

SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY REFURBISHING CONTRACT--The branch of Kongsberg Arms Factory at Narvik has received a contract for the refurbishing of the Armed Forces' park of self-propelled artillery, the so-called M109. The contract also comprises supplies of parts to West Germany, which is scheduled to modernize its artillery of this type. "This will ensure employment in the workshop at Narvik for some years," the chief of the Armed Forces division at the Kongsberg Arms Factory, Jens Charles Widt, tells AFTENPOSTEN. The contract means that the Kongsberg Arms Factory at Narvik will need an additional one hundred employees in the future. That means an increase in the work force by 50 percent. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 May 856 p 21] 7262

CSO: 3639/116

MILITARY

SPAIN

DEFENSE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCES PARTICIPATION IN NATO ARMS PROJECTS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 8 May 86 p 26

[Text] Yesterday, Spain signed five plans for cooperation in the manufacture of weapons and communications systems with other NATO countries, utilizing a special U.S. financing fund amounting to \$200 million, as the undersecretary of defense, Eduardo Serra, announced yesterday.

Spain will participate in three electronic identification systems (Nis, Ada, and Yilinz), in the manufacture of 155 millimeter ammunition with precision guidance, and in a system of guided weapons with a computer launched from the air toward ground targets.

These plans will be carried out starting in 1988 or 1995, and are the ones of most military and technical interest to Spain out of seven plans approved yesterday at a meeting of the NATO general directors of armament, reinforced by the attendance of the Alliance's defense vice ministers.

U.S. Senator Sam Nunn introduced an amendment to his country's defense budget to finance these weapons cooperation plans with \$200 million.

At a press conference held at the conclusion of the meeting, Serra said that Spain is moving from underdevelopment to a European level in arms manufacture and technological development.

Serra added that Spain has expended an unprecedented effort on research and development of weapons systems, increasing the pertinent share of the budget by 500 percent.

Serra declared that his country would make a leap forward to reinforce the most competitive area of the Spanish industry.

2909

CSO: 3548/56

MILITARY

SPAIN

GENERAL STRESSES MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF CANARIES ARCHIPELAGO

Madrid ABC in Spanish 20 May 86 p 28

[Interview with Canaries Military Zone chief, Lt Gen Francisco Ferrer Fores, by Luis Bencomo, in Santa Cruz de Tenerife; date not specified]

[Excerpts] In an interview granted on the occasion of Armed Forces Week, the celebration of which has been moved to the archipelago this year, ABC was told by the commander in chief of the Canaries Military Zone, Lt Gen Francisco Ferrer Fores: "The Canaries' most pressing military problem is that of low-level antiaircraft defense, which is being solved."

[Question] What is the current state of the islands' defense?

[Answer] It is associated with what has been established in the Joint Strategic Plan, which we can describe as a medium defense capacity. In any event, it should be clearly realized that this cannot be considered in an isolated fashion, and that the same thing is going on on any part of the national territory.

[Question] What force does the theory of the Balearic-Gibraltar-Canaries axis have?

[Answer] This (allow me to correct you) is not a theory; it is a result of a geostrategic situation marked by greater responsibilities. We are located at an end of Europe, straddling the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, where we have archipelagos under our sovereignty, in other words, interests; and, on the other hand, we are located on both shores of the Strait of Gibraltar, which is the most heavily traveled maritime route in the world, and a necessary passage to the Atlantic. Therefore, the axis formed is nothing but a result of our situation and the defense of our interests. This has permanent force.

[Question] What are the requirements in the defense area existing in the archipelago?

[Answer] Defense, like all the activities subject to budget figures, always presents more necessities than possibilities. That holds true here, and among the great powers of the world. The problem that is probably most pressing in the Canaries, among others, is that of low-level antiaircraft defense, which is being solved.

Roland Missiles

[Question] Are you referring to Roland missile mobile batteries?

[Answer] The Roland missile, which Spain already has on order, will meet that low-level antiaircraft defense requirement. Let's hope that the Canaries will be given this equipment as part of the Strategic Plan's provisions.

[Question] Will Spain's remaining in NATO in any way change the theory of the defense of this southern flank of Spain?

[Answer] Absolutely not. The archipelago's strategic importance, by now explained more than sufficiently, has not changed because of our remaining in NATO. What has unquestionably changed is the potential of this defense, which has improved substantially, as it has in the rest of the national territory.

[Question] Is there any kind of monitoring of the nearby war in the Sahara, between Polisario and the Moroccans, on the part of the Canaries' commander in chief's office?

[Answer] That monitoring and its assessment are incumbent on the highest ranking institutions of the nation.

[Question] Could a crisis such as that involving Libya in any way affect the Canaries, apart from the possible future repercussions that it might have on the rest of Spain?

[Answer] The Libyan crisis cannot affect the Canaries any differently than the rest of the national territory. I have already told you that defense affects the entire country. It would be something else if the Canaries were to be in any way threatened and there had to be a response to this rejecting it.

[Question] How is the fact that the Canaries have more clearly become a border region considered from a defense standpoint?

[Answer] The Canaries' strategic role has not changed; conditions have been placed upon it by leaving the Sahara "hinterland." You see, when we had the Sahara, the archipelago was a logistical base for that territory; there arrived there what the Canaries ordered, coming mainly from the peninsula or other parts of the world. There has been an improvement in this aspect, since we have one less concern. From an operational standpoint, the problem has become more acute, since we have our potential reinforcements at a greater distance; and it has improved if we realize that the peninsula's ports of embarkation have far greater guarantees than the Saharan ones. In short, the difference is not substantial.

Base in Arinaga

[Question] There has been much talk about an alleged base in Arinaga. What is the status of that plan, if such a situation exists there?

[Answer] The alleged base at Arinaga is, to date, nothing more than that, a plan. The decision on its construction is beyond my authority, and it will be a government decision.

[Question] A high-ranking Air Force official declared at the Gando base while taking office that there were aircraft available in the Canaries capable of operating on Moroccan soil and returning to their base within a short time. How can such statements be interpreted at the present time? What radius of action does the military apparatus located in Gando have?

[Answer] Of course, the airplanes that Wing No 46, based in Gando, has are the F-1's, a plane with remarkable features, capable of exceeding Mach 2, with a endurance of over 3 hours. With such features, you can presume that it is equipped to operate on the African continent.

[Question] From a military standpoint, is there any concern over the presence of groups demanding the archipelago's independence, claiming that they do not feel that they are Spanish? Do you consider them capable of attempting to disturb some of the ceremonies marking the coming Spanish Armed Forces Week?

[Answer] There is truly not the slightest concern over the presence of those groups which I would dare to describe as "little groups." What they do evoke is indignation, by their desire to upset the sentiments of a people in which the sense of being Spanish is as great as or more intense than that of any region of the peninsula; particularly if their arguments are filled with pomposity, demagoguery, and inadmissible interests.

2909

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MILITARY

SPAIN

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF ARMS EXPORTS SAID LACKING

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 26 May 86 pp 57-63

[Article by Juan Cacicedo: "Arms Exporting Eludes Government Control"]

[Text] Various dictatorships, countries at war, and racist regimes are currently using weapons and ammunition "made in Spain." The government, in its time, pledged stricter legislation concerning the end control of exports, but it has not yet appeared. Meanwhile, the Spanish weapons industry is faced with the challenge of new technologies and urgently needed reconversion of its product lines that will force it to export everything possible in order to be really competitive.

The Spanish weapons companies are exporting military equipment to over 50 countries. Some of them make a good profit from such purchases, because they do not delay in making use of them, or reselling them to third countries. The Spanish Government can hardly prevent this, because the final destination of those exports is completely beyond its control.

It is now over a year that the government has planned new legislation to increase control over arms exports, but it has been delayed indefinitely.

Apolonio Ruiz-Ligero himself, general director of trade policy and chairman of the Interministerial Board to Regulate Foreign Trade in Arms and Explosives, claims not to know any feature of the regulations being prepared by the Defense Ministry, and takes it for granted that, in any event, "we shall have to wait for the next legislature."

At present, this board, comprised of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Commerce, is responsible for granting permits for weapons exports, and can require of exporters a "certificate of final destination."

Such certificates are not difficult to procure, because there are countries willing to issue them, since they serve as legal protection for suspect operations. Therefore, organizations with peaceful purposes, such as Amnesty International, have for some time been calling for stricter legislation of the Spanish administration.

Among the controls proposed is a so-called "human rights clause," regarding the end use of weapons, the existence of a public register of such exports in the General Bureau of Customs, and the creation of a commission for parliamentary control of the final destination of the sales.

Until this arrives, dictators such as Augusto Pinochet or King Hassan II are using Spanish military equipment, rifles and pistols from our country are being unloaded in the racist South African Republic, and "made in Spain" bombs are exploding in conflicts such as the one currently being held by Iran and Iraq.

Decline in Exports

Despite everything, during 1985 the Spanish weapons industry exported arms valued at 86 billion pesetas, with a sizable decline from the previous year, when exports totaled 130 billion pesetas. The crisis among some of its traditional clients and the competition from countries such as Greece, Yugoslavia, and South Korea, with cheaper labor, were to blame.

Spanish weapons exports have essentially Third World countries as a destination, with 50 percent sent to Latin America, 45 percent to the Arab countries, and a scant 5 percent divided between Africa and the rest of the world.

Last year, those exports were concentrated basically on ammunition (30 percent of the total sales), aircraft (25), machine guns (10), recoilless guns (10), and short-barreled weapons (5).

Over 50 percent of the export figures is shared among only four public enterprises: CASA [Aeronautical Construction, Inc], Bazan, Santa Barbara, and ENASA [National Motor Truck Enterprise]. Oddly enough, all those enterprises registered losses in 1984, although in the case of ENASA-Pegaso, the problem lies in the civilian vehicle division.

During recent years, Aeronautical Construction (CASA) has delivered to Chile about 20 C-101 Aviojets, a basic training aircraft, but equipped to carry out attack action. Four of these planes, equipped with six cargo points under their wings, were supplied to Honduras during 1984, despite that country's conflict with Nicaragua.

Chile, which pays for this equipment through a barter operation, supplying Spain with Pillan aircraft, has also received military and all terrain trucks from Pegaso. Some of them have been used as antiriot equipment to suppress demonstrations.

Last year, Morocco received four patrol boats built by the Bazan National Enterprise. Two years earlier, this enterprise had sold the North African country a corvette of the "Descubierta" type, now christened "Colonel Errahmani."

Spanish equipment is playing an active role at present in the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Whereas Iraq uses the BO-105 helicopters made by CASA in

Getafe, under a German license, Iran is using Land Rover-Santana vehicles arriving from our country.

In such instances, the manufacturers usually claim that the supplies of the military equipment used were provided before the conflict began. This does not appear to have happened in the case of Somalia which, during its war with Ethiopia, received half a dozen Aviocar C-212 transport planes which are versatile for civilian and military use, two Bazan "Cormoran" patrol boats, and BMR 600 amphibious vehicles from ENASA.

Argentina too, during the military dictatorship, has been a recipient of Spanish weaponry. Ammunition, explosives, and Bazan's "Halcon" type coast guard vessels left Spain with that destination at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the current one.

The Private Business

While the public enterprises are losing money despite their voluminous transactions assessed at hundreds of millions of dollars, the private firms are doing business that is difficult to quantify, owing to the confidentiality that prevails in this sector.

Alaveses Explosives (EXPAL) manufactures different types of fire bombs and explosives used widely in the most recent military conflicts.

Bombs from this firm with headquarters in Vitoria were dropped by the Argentine planes on British ships during the Falklands War, and the Iraqis have used them in its war with Iran. EXPAL's bombs operated 4 years ago in the Vietnam War, used by the United States, and Hassan II's Army has used them against the Polisario Front.

It is also private companies which control the exports of short-barreled weapons, sub-rifles and hunting rifles to the Republic of South Africa. Llama Gabilondo, Astra Unceta, Aguirre Aranzabal, Star, Lander Arms, and Zabala Brothers, combined, bill that country about 300 million pesetas annually.

The short-barreled weapons, ammunition, and explosives are the leading products of private companies, also prominent among which are Rio Tinto Explosives, with 10 percent of the volume of Spanish exports, Esperanza & Co., Placencia Arms, Inc, and Instalaza, the latter engaged in making rocket launchers and ammunition.

But the big business in this sector, as in many others, lies among the marketing firms and the middlemen. The most important one, different from the rest, is Alkantara Iberian Exports Limited, founded 8 years ago with 50 percent public capital (INI [National Institute of Industry] and Focoex) and the remaining 50 percent from the Saudi firm Triad International.

Wielding considerable control over Alkantara is the Arab multimillionaire Adnan Shashoggi, who is very well connected in Spain and has procured major contracts for arms supplies to Arab countries.

Included among his leading operations is the so-called contract of the century, whereby Spain sold Egypt, during 1982, 600 BMR 600 armored vehicles, 1,200 buses, and 10,600 Pegaso all terrain trucks, for a total of \$859 million (over \$120 billion at the current exchange rate).

This contract, financed on very advantageous terms by the Exterior Bank of Spain, included an agreement on payment for installing in Egypt individual systems for assembling BMR trucks and vehicles. Later, two "Descubierta" frigates were sold for 70 billion pesetas, and 2,000 Land Rovers for 3 billion.

In addition to subsequent transactions with Egypt involving "Cormoran" ships and "Agosta" submarines, Khashoggi has also participated in supplying transport planes to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Also sold to the latter country were the C-101 Aviojets and air bombs suspected to have had Iraq as a final destination.

Other marketing firms are Gamesa, with considerable activity, and Defex, with the participation of the leading public enterprises in the sector, whose activity is claimed to be concentrated more on publishing brochures than on selling arms.

Spain, a Bridge Country

The possibility of controlling the end destination of arms exports is really difficult in an industry heavily dependent on exports, in which there prevails the view that "if I hold my nose without seeing, others will do it for me."

Libya is one of the countries suspected of serving as a bridge for sending arms to warring zones. Recently, the supply of ammunition originating in Spain and Italy from Tripoli to Iran was charged internationally.

But Spain is not exactly a country that can complain of such practices, because it has on occasion also served as a bridge for exporting to rather undesirable areas.

Last year, the trial began in Germany against Rheinmetallwerke, a manufacturer of antiaircraft guns and ammunition which, according to the charge, had supplied equipment (through Spain, Paraguay, and Italy) to countries such as Argentina and South Africa.

In UNESCO's Yearbook of Studies on Peace and Conflicts, which appeared in our country a few days ago, note is made of our share in the illegal transfer to South Africa of howitzers and combat tanks in transactions carried out at the end of the 1970's through the firm Barreiros Brothers International. The equipment originated in the United Kingdom.

During the next few years, the Spanish arms industry, which currently has 56,000 workers and an annual billing of over 200 billion pesetas, will be facing a major reconversion, to provide it with a higher technological level.

Contributing to this transformation will be the participation in such European projects as ACE (European Combat Airplane), the frigate of the '90s, the third generation missile, or the joint manufacture of combat tanks. There will emerge from this a capacity for developing new advanced weapons systems, the profitability and competitiveness of which will be created by the capacity for raising export rates.

The medium-term goals of the Spanish weapons industry are to sell guidance systems, both with ammunition and missiles, (radar) detection systems, missiles, ACE program equipment, combat tanks, armored vehicles, high-caliber artillery, and information processing techniques. To procure access to the technology that would allow for the development of these systems, Spain has been requiring, in the purchases that it makes abroad, compensation entailing the nationalization of the systems purchased.

At a meeting with business owners from the sector, the state defense secretary, Eduardo Serra, warned them: "The challenge that you face is that of exporting an increasingly higher percentage of your own production." The idea is to attempt to export advanced weaponry to countries within the NATO orbit; something that will take time to achieve.

Meanwhile, Spain will have to continue to be commercially linked to countries with dubious intentions; which, in the future, will demand an increasingly more stringent control over exports. Because no business owner in the sector is willing to miss a good opportunity to sell, regardless of who the recipient may be. No one wants to be like Germany which, at the beginning of the 1970's, refused to sell its tanks to Spain because this country was still a dictatorship. France had no qualms about providing us with the AMX-30, which is currently being manufactured by Santa Barbara with a license. Where arms are concerned, everyone wants to be France.

Those Who Sell the Most (in billions)

	Sales	Exports	Employees	Profits and Losses
Bazan				
1983	76,772	39,460	14,087	-6,374
1984	76,896	28,309	13,571	-12,717
CASA				
1983	41,199	27,691	9,803	469
1984	43,365	36,741	10,037	-270
Santa Barbara				
1983	16,191	9,881	4,148	-3,631
1984	24,095	14,084	3,870	-3,636
2909				
CSO: 3548/56				

ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

KEMPINAIRE ON DEVELOPMENT AID POLICY, FINANCES

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 30 Apr 86 pp 40-44

[Interview by correspondent Kris LeLievre-Damit with Andre Kempinaire, secretary of state of Cooperation for Development: 'Whoever Does Too Much Does Nothing']

[Text] Of all the ministers or state secretaries who have headed the Department of Cooperation for Development, since Zaire's independence, Andre Kempinaire (PVV) is undoubtedly the most well traveled. He was previously, among other things in China, Thailand, Washington, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Zaire. That provided him with a great deal of practical experience, from which the lines of force of his policy are now gradually visible. Below is an interview with Andre Kempinaire, hardly back from Zaire, and already hastily preparing for a trip to Ruanda and Burundi.

[Question] You now have been Secretary of State of Cooperation for Development almost 6 months. In that short time, you have already clashed several times with the CVP faction in the Chamber. The first collision is the notorious 0.7 percent of the GNP that our country would be obligated to give for Third World assistance according to previous international agreements. Is that no magic number for you?

[Answer] It is written in the governing agreement in so many words that Belgium should try to reach the figure of 0.7. Naturally that is my goal. But we now must consider the budgetary limitations in our country. If in the Saint Anna Priory, certain sacrifices are sought in all sectors of the national revenue budget, the Department of Cooperation for Development cannot be an exception. There is no other way if we again want to make our country financially healthy around 1988 or 1989. Just as the economic reform is realized, it will be easier to convert the goal of 0.7 percent into a fact.

[Question] Other ministers try to limit the damage as much as possible if it involves economies in their ministry. In your case, it seems more like a definite hint to the minister of the budget, Guy Verhofstadt, that several billions are there to be picked up?

[Answer] Certainly not. I have always said that the governing agreement is my most important ally and that means that we must be with the 0.7 percent at the end of the session. I only assume that, in view of Belgium's bad financial situation, we cannot have everything for the moment. And we must not be ashamed of that. Of all the countries which are doing something for the Third World, we are in sixth place, after the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. We have already reached for some time an international goal, namely 0.15 percent assistance for the least developed countries.

[Question] At the moment, your budget is an insignificant 15 billion francs. Johan Van Hecke, the spokesman for development cooperation of the CVP parliamentary fraction would prefer to operate gradually. He wants to let expenditures increase by 5 billion each year, instead of having to find 15 billion all at once in 1989 to reach the 0.7 percent.

[Answer] We must also consider that other ministries are involved in development cooperation, such as finance, education and defense. Consequently each one must contribute his mite over several years to live up to the governing agreement.

[Question] A second point about which a clear disagreement exists between you and the CVP parliamentary fraction is whether or not to split up ABOS [General Administration for Development Cooperation]. Johan Van Hecke himself says you refuse to split it up, in spite of a clear consensus in all Flemish parties.

[Answer] In my party, which moreover is a government party, we want to preserve foreign policy unity. Consequently, I flatly dispute that a consensus about splitting up ABOS would exist in all Flemish parties. As a matter of fact, when I was abroad, I felt very strongly that all community aspects of foreign policy have not disappeared in it, certainly when I was on a visit with Belgians. Therefore, we must try at the top to step outside united. There do exist some actual divisions, such as the VVOB [Flemish Association for Training Abroad] and its Walloon counterpart, the APEFE, [not further identified] but those are policies which my predecessors have selected and which I want to observe.

[Question] Do you not think that the Flemings have an obviously different view of development cooperation, compared with the Walloons?

[Answer] I think, on the contrary, that more and more consultation is taking place. When I consider the level of cofinancing of the NCOS [not further identified] and its Walloon counterpart, then I ascertain that there are many contacts there. The same must be true in ABOS. It would still be stupid to have to conduct the evaluations of the projects in a divided administration twice. The standard for granting assistance also remains the same for both communities. It involves in the first place humanitarian assistance and in the second place the improvement of food production in the Third World. Those are things in which certainly no division must arise between Flemings and Walloons.

Formal Agreements

[Question] Your predecessor De Donnea, was constantly at loggerheads in the previous government with his tutelary minister Leo Tindemans at Foreign Affairs. How is your relationship with Tindemans?

[Answer] I have no problem with Leo Tindemans. The difference with my predecessor is that he actually was a newcomer and had to develop an image in Brussels. I have been in politics a long time and I do not feel the least need to express myself.

[Question] De Donnea had always refused to sign a so-called agreement with Tindemans. That is really a sort of division of labor. You have probably done that and moreover a policy note has reached your cabinet which states that you may not come out with new foreign initiatives, especially before Tindemans is informed about that.

[Answer] I do not attach so much importance to all those formal agreements. I consider dialogue more important, both from my standpoint with Leo Tindemans, as well as vice-versa. Every time I take a foreign trip, for that matter, people from his ministry go with me. I do not regard that as Moscow's eye spying on me, but a way of preventing misunderstandings.

[Question] The minister of foreign affairs can sleep soundly about one matter. You want to end once and for all the abuses about the language proportions in your department.

[Answer] The language proportions are right at ABOS in Brussels. On the other hand, in the field, 1,790 French-speaking development workers operate compared with only 1,418 Flemings. That difference is partly to be attributed to the large number of French-speaking teachers who were employed in the initial period of our cooperation in French-speaking education in Zaire, Ruanda and Burundi. A second cause is that over the years an average of fewer Flemings than French speakers have applied for cooperation. I give you the latest figures: from 1983 until now, a total of 67.2 percent French speakers applied, compared with 32.8 percent Dutch speakers.

[Question] Can that not be eliminated with an active appointment policy in favor of the Flemings? It is really not true that no Dutch-speaking applications come in at all?

[Answer] First of all, I want to say that the number of applications through ABOS is rather limited, approximately 125 per year. Moreover, I must take into account a number of statutory priorities which prevent such an active appointment policy. In 339 appointments, my predecessor could really only choose in 87 cases. In those he appointed 40 French speakers and 47 Dutch speakers. There were naturally no Flemings here during the previous legislature. I myself want to do better. In the past 5 months, I had a real choice in four cases. Of those, three positions went to Dutch speakers and only one to a French speaker.

[Question] How long will it be before the balance is restored?

[Answer] It is naturally impossible to do everything in 1 or 2 years. In view of the Belgian situation, it is out of the question that not another French speaker would go to the Third World in the near future. Still I have asked that ABOS should allow the nomination and selection of candidates to take place on two lists, so that I have somewhat more room to operate.

Dispersion

[Question] Is there not also the possibility of making somewhat more effort regarding nongovernmental development cooperation? Interest there among the Flemings is apparently a bit higher. At the moment there are 614 Flemish volunteers compared with 519 French speakers.

[Answer] In the NGO's [nongovernmental organizations] other criteria must be taken into account, such as the value of the project. I would consider it a pity if more money would be spent for NGO's, only to achieve language balance. During my travels, I have seen NGO projects which were outstanding and others which operate less effectively. There are obviously other criteria besides language balance to stimulate NGO projects.

[Question] Is it therefore that you recently have decided that the NGO's from now on would pass by in the inspections of finances and that for each new application, you must first wait on a favorable recommendation from our Belgian Embassy on the spot. That would result in a delay of months.

[Answer] Budget inspection was thoroughly changed by the previous government and as a result of that I was forced to have the NGO's inspected by the finance services. But that is an insignificant loss of time. As regards the recommendation of our ambassador, I have assumed a period of a month. The NGO's operate to a great extent with government money and it is consequently not unjustified to first find out the opinion of people who are informed about the situation in the developing country. If our embassy thinks that a definite project is not really viable, I can better support other projects.

[Question] On the other hand, a third of your budget goes to the so-called multilateral sector. You have not so long ago given 1.5 billion to IFAD [International Fund for Agricultural Development] for projects in the poorest countries south of the Sahara. Inspection is also minimal there. In IFAD only 4 Belgians work among 80 cadre personnel.

[Answer] Those projects were included in large organizations which can boast of a certain experience and have, moreover, a much larger infrastructure to successfully carry out their assignments. For that matter, I consider it difficult how we could control projects of that scope ourselves. You must not ask Belgium to join by itself the struggle against, for example, the desertification on the African continent.

You were previously State Secretary for Foreign Commerce. Many probably knitted their eyebrows when you transferred to cooperation for development. In recent years there has been so much criticism of the increasing commercialism in our granting of assistance. Do you consider it justified, for example, that money from development assistance is involved in Manila's giant metro project or in the new telephone exchanges in China?

[Answer] I believe that such projects in those types of countries contribute to further development. In Manila, 250,000 people are now transported daily. That is also important in the light of the social advancement of the people. Only it is on quite a different level from our assistance to poor farmers in Zaire.

[Question] One of the lines of force of your predecessor's policy was to first successfully complete the existing or approved projects, instead of always only making new promises. You have already announced a new development policy for Thailand and Zaire and you are probably going soon to the Philippines and Haiti. Will we be able to fulfill all those new promises in the future?

[Answer] What is in progress must naturally be completed successfully. But we also intend to phase out certain projects in some countries and not to renew them in the foreseeable future. That will be the case in Zaire, among other things, where we want to concentrate on projects more from the geographic and sector standpoint. My thinking is always: whoever does too much, does nothing. I want to restrict the dispersion. In this way, money is released for other countries.

Fish in the Sun

[Question] You have discussed Zaire. During your latest visit to that country you again confirmed that our agricultural expenses there must be increased from 4 to 20 percent of the budget. Those are subjects with which your predecessor, Daniel Coens, was already busy. What guarantees do you have that it now finally will succeed?

[Answer] According to my program, it must be attainable about 1987. But that will naturally take place at the expense of the reorientation of the educational sector. In the coming academic year a total of 44 teaching positions will be eliminated.

[Question] There is talk of a certain panic among the teachers in Zaire.

[Answer] During my stay in that country, representatives of the trade unions clearly said to me that they are accepting the staff reduction of educational cooperation, but they would like to know well enough in advance who is being considered for gradual discharge. Consequently people should not be placed from day to day before the chopping-knife and they should have time to re-adjust. However, I would like to add that the 44 people will not all be eliminated as cooperation workers. Part of them will be included in other sectors of our assistance work in Zaire.

[Question] Will you also release money in Zaire through the Fund for Development Cooperation for joint ventures between Zairian enterprises and Belgian KMO's [not further identified].

[Answer] Someone from the Economic and Social Institute for the Middle Class will soon leave for Zaire on our instructions to observe on the spot what opportunities exist there and for what sectors we could risk that experiment. However in the initial period, there will not be too many, at the most two to three.

[Question] They probably will all remain in the neighborhood of the large centers?

[Answer] That is not necessary. I myself have visited a fishing village on Idi Amin Lake which is highly active in the fishing field, but does not have the opportunity to transport the fish to the large centers. Cooperation with a Belgian KMO, through participation of the Fund for Development Cooperation would do wonders there. For what is the problem? The fish are still dried in the sun and not stored in cold storage warehouses. If one wants to go from that village to the large market in Gomma or elsewhere, in the burning sun, then not a single fish is still edible.

[Question] Is this not the beginning of a new privatization initiative in the Agriprom [not further identified] manner?

[Answer] Not at all. It is only my intention to sub-contract a limited number of assignments, such as transportation and shipment items. If more interesting initiatives appear, those can naturally always be investigated.

8490

CSO: 3614/110

ECONOMIC

GREECE

DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING HOUSING CONTRACT WITH ALGERIA

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Jun 86 pp 1, 3

/Text/ The operations of the state firm EKETE /Greek State Company for Technical Projects/ have created serious problems for Minister of Public Works and the Environment Evan. Kouloubis, under whose responsibility the firm lies, because of bad management of projects it undertook in Algeria.

According to completely reliable sources, the minister has voiced great concern over the entire matter. He has asked for explanations both from EKETE officials and from Mr Frangoulis, our ambassador in Algeria.

Moreover, it has become known that the Algerian ambassador to Athens visited Mr Kouloubis at the latter's office following an invitation to obtain necessary information on the Algerian Government's position vis-a-vis EKETE and other Greek construction firms that work with EKETE in Algeria. The Algerian ambassador, who affected ignorance on the overall issue, undertook to inform his government.

As is known, in accordance with a contract signed in the summer of 1985, EKETE and the Greek Construction Companies Partnership, that work as subcontractors to EKETE, undertook construction of 3,000 housing units (and not 10,000 as was initially and noisily announced when the prime minister had visited Algeria in 1983) in the cities of Biskra and Zizel. According to exclusive information of I KATHIMERINI, serious problems have arisen at the Biskra work site due to the inability of the EDOK /as published/-ETER /as published/, Makedoniki, EKTER /as published/ and PSYKTIKI firms to meet construction requirements. The inability of some of the above-mentioned firms to come up with the necessary letters of guarantee because of financial difficulties has brought to a standstill all operations for the construction of 1,500 housing units in Biskra province. The overall project has therefore been significantly delayed with the result that the competent Algerian Government services have undertaken a radical review of all Greek projects. (In the meantime, foreign technical circles in Algeria have made it known that the Algerian Ministry of Construction has already begun negotiations with a French multinational construction company to handle part of the Biskra project).

As a result of the inability of EKETE's subcontractors (EDOK, etc.) to carry out the project and since EKETE has not been able to find other subcontractors, the Algerians no longer approve of continuing the Biskra project and have considered EKETE as having forfeited on its obligations. There are also serious suspicions that the

abnormal situation in Biskra will carry over into the Zizel project (another 1,500 housing units are scheduled to be built there) where the main work has not yet begun due to the delays on the part of the Algerians (cleaning up of the area, demarcation of housing sites, etc.). Fair questions, therefore, have cropped up as to EKETE's manner of operations, its being staffed by experienced technicians and more generally its management.

5671

CSO: 3521/162

ECONOMIC

GREECE

BRIEFS

MEASURES FOR AILING FIRMS--The implementation of the plan providing corrective measures for problem companies has begun with the announcement of the firing of workers and the breakup of the biggest ailing firm (Peiraiki-Patriaki) into 10 smaller firms. Yesterday Deputy Minister V. Papandreou announced the government's policy in this critical sector involving over-indebted firms. The announcement admitted that the tactics followed by the government in recent years were proven to be particularly damaging to the economy and led to the wasting of dozens of billions of drachmas for preserving non-viable companies. Mr Papandreou's admission and similar declarations the day before yesterday by the government spokesman (that was attributed to the minister of labor) brought about a strong reaction from former Minister of National Economy Ger. Arsenis who handled these matters up to 1985. In a statement issued yesterday, Mr Arsenis strongly defended the proposals he had enunciated and he pointed out that "if they had been implemented we would not now have to face the problem of worker firings." Because of the developments taking place and the political dimensions assumed by the issue, Mr Arsenis called on the government to open a dialogue on television to discuss ailing firms. Indeed, following a personal attack on him and because of the importance of the issue, he said that he would himself submit an interpellation to the Chamber of Deputies. /Text/ /Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5 Jun 86 p 1/ 5671

CSO: 3521/162

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

PAPER REPORTS ON 1985 FOREIGN INVESTMENT DATA

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 6 May 86 p 16

[Text] In 1985, direct foreign investment in Portugal totaled 42.4 million contos compared to 27.6 million the previous year, representing an increase of 53.2 percent.

In escudos, the increase for the period was 29.3 percent, thus confirming the rising trend that has remained consistent since 1983.

In dollars, the increase was 31.7 percent compared to previous years, a figure that can be considered substantial despite the negative evolution of U.S. currency.

In terms of sectors, noteworthy are: the contribution of the banking sector and other financial institutions (21 percent), paper industry (20 percent), chemical industries (10 percent), ore mining (9 percent), and electromechanical industries (7 percent).

By country, the ranking of the first nine places was as follows: United Kingdom, 42 percent; United States, 15; France, 8; Switzerland, 6; Netherlands and Belgium, 5 percent; Federal Republic of Germany and Spain, 4 percent. Macau also contributed with an investment of 4 percent. The leading position occupied by the United Kingdom is explained by three large projects: Soporcel, Somincor, and Barclays Bank.

By type of operation, the creation of companies and the increases of capital continue to represent more than 80 percent of total investment, 24.6 percent pertaining to new companies and 60.1 percent going to increases of capital.

8711/7051

CSO: 3542/103

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

POPULATION STATISTICS SHOW SMALL INCREASE

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 21 May 86 p 13

[Text] In 1984, Portugal had 10.129 million inhabitants, 4.887 million of whom were of the male sex and 5.242 million of the female sex; representing an increase of 0.8 percent.

The growth is due essentially to the movement of returning emigrants, according to a report from the National Statistics Institute distributed yesterday. The natural growth was 45,800 persons, and the immigration growth total was larger than during the previous year, reaching 33,400.

Owing to this return of emigrants, the imbalance in the male female ratio declined, standing at the level of 93.2 men for every 100 women in 1984.

The group of individuals aged under 15 years accounted for 23.8 percent of the population, while those aged over 55 represented 11.8 percent.

The birth rate dropped from 144,300 in 1983 to 142,800 in 1984, but an increase was recorded in the number of first births in comparison with the previous year, representing 46.4 percent of the total. In contrast, the proportion of births out of wedlock continued to rise, while the fertility rates declined among all age groups, with a maximum rate of 116.9 live births recorded per 1,000 women in the age group of 20-24 years.

An increase also occurred in the absolute number of deaths, although the gross mortality rate remained stable, at a level of 9.6 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants. On the other hand, the infant death rate continued to decline during 1984, dropping from 19.2 to 16.7 deaths per 1,000 live births.

With regard to marriage, the average age at the first marriage rose, and the frequency of first marriages underwent a 7 percent reduction.

Although the demographic statistics showed that the number of marriages dissolved by divorce declined from 8,000 in 1983 to 7,000 in 1984, an increase was recorded in the divorce rate during the period 1975-84, rising from 1.5 to 7.0 per 1,000 inhabitants.

2909

CSO: 3542/110

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

EDITORIAL SAYS EEC AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE NEEDED STABILITY

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 28 Apr 86 p 1

[Editorial: Three Years of Stability in Textiles"]

[Text] The textile agreement signed in Brussels 2 weeks ago with the European Economic Community, in addition to allowing easy breathing in this "favorite" of export sectors through the end of 1988, also represents a process of change, since the perspective in foreign trade relations has changed.

Practically everything in international relations seems to have changed after the idea of expecting too much from diplomacy, the bad experiences and the loss of certain advantages. The agreement signed in Brussels will make it possible for this sector to plan investments, production and exports for the next 3 years. The agreement, for 3 years renewable each year, represents 3 years of stability in the textile and garment industry.

Another distinctive aspect of the agreement is that it has changed the way of looking at textile disagreements. Turkey, unlike the Western trading system, looks at commercial and diplomatic relations together, but this time did not respond emotionally, "confusing the two issues," as the West sees it. At first, in the textile negotiations first with the EEC and later with countries such as Sweden and the United States, the Turkish thesis was something like, "We have a deficit in our foreign trade with you and the only way we can make it up is with textile exports. The exchange rate you apply to all other countries should not be binding upon us," to which the other side always responded with mystifying logic. Concepts such as "friendship and alliance" could not affect the outcome, so unilateral restrictions were targeted. First, the loss of the Swedish textile market and then the ongoing quarrel with the United States and the GATT brought about the reality of getting to know and accept the Western system. Turkey ignored the political implications of the Autolimitation Agreement and recognized that, in a sense, it is not political, but primarily economic.

According to the export staff at the Treasury and Foreign Trade Under Secretariat, Turkey no longer has a problem in textile exports to the EEC. Turkey's EEC textile exports are not limited only by the quotas. According to the staffs, who say, "Country A, for example, has a quota from the EEC, but cannot fulfill its quotas. We can sell goods cut out and ready to be sewn to that country. Those goods go to the EEC as a shirt or whatever, bearing the

labels of that country," Germany represents an open road. Since Germany usually overlooks exceeded quotas for Turkish textile products, the quotas set for Turkish textile exports to the EEC are not the only determining factor.

Although the Treasury and Foreign Trade Under Secretariat officials' confidence, expressed in the remark, "Turkey is learning this business," seems to have solved the problem on the foreign front, the recent upward slide of cotton prices to 300 liras higher than on the foreign markets makes it necessary to be ready for significant problems at home. Otherwise, the textile sector, which is one of Turkey's "comparative advantages," may have to rely for superiority on "cheap labor" alone, and, in that, Turkey is not alone.

8349

CSO: 3554/59

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

OFFICIALS COMMENT ON EFFORTS TO OPEN SEE'S TO PUBLIC

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 28 Apr 86 p 4

[Article by Bayram Basaran in "Capital Market" section]

[Excerpt] Treasury and Foreign Trade Under Secretariat officials, after watching the stock sessions at the Istanbul Securities Exchange said there were not enough bidding stalls. Halit Kara, director of the State Industry and Worker Investment Bank [DESIYAB], said that the SEE [State Economic Enterprises] Commission's efforts to put the SEE's on the market were inadequate.

Among observers at the exchange were Treasury and Foreign Trade Deputy Under Secretaries Yener Dincmen and Mahir Barutcu, Treasury and Foreign Trade Exchange Rate Branch officials, DESIYAB General Director Halit Kara and officials from exchange members' liaison bodies.

DESIYAB General Director Halit Kara, visiting the Exchange, pointed out that they were looking for an office location in Istanbul in order to begin actual operations. He said:

"We at DESIYAB have completed our efforts. We have only one problem. We have to find a location in Istanbul, then we will begin active operations on the exchange. We are considering selling shares of eight companies that we hold as our first offering. I do not wish to reveal the names of them at present."

Halit Kara said later, in answer to a question, that the SEE Commission's work was progressing very slowly and added:

"As a member of the SEE Commission, I do not think the work that ought to be done to open the SEE's to the public is being done adequately. The efforts are inadequate. USAS [expansion unknown], Turkish Airlines and Northern Electric Telecommunications Corporation are first in line for going public. However, financial analyses of these companies have not even been conducted yet."

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